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I. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review, reverse or annul the final judgment and 
conviction rendered by the Third Judicial Circuit Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah in this 
criminal case. Rule 26(2)(a) Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (1989) (Addendum 1), and 
Judicial Code §78-2a-3(2)(f) U.C.A. (1953 as amended) (Addendum 2). 
n. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether appellant's constitutional rights as guaranteed by the United States 
Constitution, Fourth Amendment, as well as Article 1, Sect. 14 of the Utah Constitution were 
violated by the investigatory detention which took longer than necessary to effect the purpose 
of the stop? State v. Marshall. 791 P.2d. 880 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), State v. Grovier. 808 
P.2d. 133 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Davis. 821 P.2d. 9 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); United States 
Constitution. Fourth Amendment: Article 1. §14 of the Utah Constitution. 
2. Whether the Circuit Court Judge erred in denying appellant's motion to Suppress 
evidence obtained after appellant's impermissible detention? State v. Marshall. 791 P.2d. 880 
(Utah App. 1990), State v. Grovier. 808 P.2d. 133 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); State v. Davis. 821 
P.2d. 9 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); United States Constitution. Fourth Amendment: Article 1. §14 
of the Utah Constitution. 
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III. 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. The standard of review for findings of fact underlying "a Trial Court's decision on a 
Motion to Suppress is the "clearly erroneous" standard. State v. Marshall, at 882 and State v. 
Grovier. at 135, 136. 
IVe 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
A. Constitutional Provisions 
1. United States Constitution, 4th Amendment (Addendum No. 3). 
2. Article 1, §14 of the Utah Constitution (Addendum No. 4). 
B. Rules of Appellate Procedure 
1. Rule 11, The Record on Appeal (Addendum No. 5). 
2. Rule 24, Briefs (Addendum No. 6). 
V. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is a criminal appeal of the Third Judicial Circuit Court's decision denying 
defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence in a DUI case (Addendum 7). 
B. Course of Proceedings 
On November 27, 1992, defendant filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence in a DUI Charge 
with Supporting Points and Authorities (Addendum 8). 
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On March 18, 1993, an Evidentiary Hearing was heard by the Third Judicial Circuit 
Court regarding defendant's Motion to Suppress (Addendum 9). 
On March 29, 1993, plaintiff filed its Response to Motion to Suppress Evidence 
(Addendum 10). 
On April 6, 1993, in response to plaintiffs Response, defendant filed a pleading entitled 
Motion to Suppress Evidence in DUI Charge (Addendum No, 11). 
On April 12, 1993, the Third Judicial Circuit Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
denied defendant's Motion to Suppress (Addendum 7). 
On April 16, 1993, the Third Judicial Circuit Court reaffirmed its decision (Addendum 
12). 
On June 17, 1993, defendant Heidi Rock entered a conditional plea of guilty to the DUI 
charge, specifically reserving the Appellate issues arising out of defendant's Motion to Suppress 
(Addendum 13 at 2, 3 and 4). 
C. Disposition at Trial Court 
The Trial Court denied defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence in a DUI Charge 
(Addendum 7). A conditional plea of guilty to the DUI charge was entered June 17, 1993, 
specifically reserving the Appellate issues arising out of defendant's Motion to Suppress 
Evidence in a DUI Charge (Addendum 13, pages 2, 3 & 4). 
VI. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT - FACTS 
An investigatory detention must be "temporary and last no longer than is necessary to 
effect the purpose of the stop." State v. Davis. 821 P.2d. 9, 12 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 
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(Addendum No. 14). 
On or about July 19, 1992, at 2:05 to 2:10 am, Heidi Rock was stopped by Officer Jed 
Hurst (Addendum 9, pages 6 & 9). Officer Hurst was off-duty at the time of the stop 
(Addendum 9, page 7). Officer Hurst had Heidi Rock perform two field tests, including the 
horizontal gaze nystagmus and the hand-slap test (Addendum 9, page 7). Following the two 
field tests, Officer Hurst did not believe he had enough probable cause for an arrest as his usual 
practice is to give four or five field sobriety tests (Addendum 9, page 19). Officer Hurst could 
have requested Heidi Rock to perform a third, fourth and fifth field sobriety test without delay 
and make a determination concerning probable cause to arrest Heidi Rock for DUI, but did not 
want to (Addendum 9, page 19). Officer Hurst had the skill, ability and training to conduct field 
sobriety tests (Addendum 9, page 19). Heidi Rock's detention was prolonged five to ten 
minutes while they waited for Officer Isakson to arrive at the scene (Addendum 9, pages 20 and 
22). During the prolonged detention, no investigation nor further field tests took place 
(Addendum 9, page 20). Heidi Rock was not free to leave while waiting for Officer Isakson to 
arrive (Addendum 9, page 20). The only reason claimed for the prolonged detention was to 
reduce the overtime pay to the Police Department (Addendum 9, page 20). Following Officer 
Isakson's arrival, Officer Hurst remained at the scene and observed all of the field tests 
conducted by Officer Isakson, which included tests previously performed by Heidi Rock during 
Officer Hurst's partial investigation (Addendum 9, page 8). Nearly one hour following the 
initial stop, Officer Hurst continued to remain present at the scene of the stop until 3:00 a.m., 
and personally performed the inventory search and impound of Ms. Rock's vehicle (Addendum 
9, pages 9 and 10). Officer Hurst was qualified to conduct sufficient field tests to determine 
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whether probable cause existed to arrest Heidi Rock, in which case, he could have arrested Heidi 
Rock and delivered her to another officer at the scene without delay (Addendum 9, page 13). 
The investigatory detention of Heidi Rock was unnecessarily delayed and lasted longer than was 
necessary to effect the purpose of the stop State v. Davis. 821 P.2d. 9, 12 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991) (Addendum 14). 
VIL 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
THE INVESTIGATORY DETENTION OF HEIDI ROCK LASTED 
LONGER THAN NECESSARY TO EFFECT THE PURPOSE OF THE STOP. 
In State v. Marshall, this court stated "the protective shield of the Fourth Amendment 
applies when an officer stops an automobile on a highway and detains its occupants. State v. 
Marshall. 791 P.2d., 880, 883 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), citing State v. Sierra. 754 P.2d. 972, 975 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) (Addendum 15). The Constitutional protections guaranteed by the United 
States and Utah Constitutions against unreasonable seizures apply here since Heidi Rock was 
stopped by the officer and was not free to leave (Addendums 1, 2, and 12, pages 6 & 20). The 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution, guarantee a fundamental right to citizens to be free from unreasonable seizures 
(Addendums 1 and 2). As such she could not be subject to an unreasonable and unnecessarily 
lengthy investigatory detention. The detention of Heidi Rock violates both the United States and 
Utah Constitutions to be free from unreasonable seizures. 
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In State v. Davis, the court stated: 
Moreover, an investigatory detention must be "temporary and last no longer than 
is necessary to effect the purpose of the stop." State v. Davis. 821 P.2d. 9, 12 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991), citing State v. Deitman. 739 P.2d. 616, 617 (Utah 1987) (citing United 
States v. Merritt. 736 F.2d. 223, 230 (5th Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 476 U.S. 1142, 106 
S.Ct. 2250, 90 L.Ed. 2d. 696 (1986)) (emphasis added). 
The cases of State v. Grovier and State v. Marshall both focus "not on the length of the 
detention alone, but on "whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was 
likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain 
the defendant." State v. Grovier. 808 P.2d. 133, 136 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), State v. Marshall. 
791 P.2d. 880, 884 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (emphasis added) (Addendum 16). The investigatory 
detention to determine by field tests whether Heidi Rock had violated a DUI law was 
unreasonable for two reasons. First, the investigatory detention lasted longer than necessary to 
effect the purpose of the stop. Officer Hurst had the skill and training to conduct the complete 
investigation without delay (Addendum 9, page 19). Officer Hurst did not diligently pursue the 
investigation when he chose to discontinue the investigation in order to wait for Officer Isakson 
to appear at the scene QxL at 20). Officer Hurst could have called for an on-duty officer to 
appear at the scene and at the same time continue with the investigation (Id. at 19). The 
detention, therefore, took longer than necessary to effect the purpose of the stop and was, 
therefore, unreasonable. 
Secondly, the investigatory detention was unreasonable since there was no legitimate 
reason to prolong the investigation. Officer Hurst claimed that the reason for the prolonged 
detention was to reduce the overtime pay to the Police Department (Id. at 20). In fact, Officer 
Hurst's actions were inconsistent with the reason given when he continued to remain at the scene 
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of the stop for nearly one hour, and personally performed the inventory search and impound of 
Ms. Rock's vehicle (Id at 9 & 10). The interest in reducing overtime pay was not served. The 
interest in reducing overtime charges to the Police Department could have been served without 
prolonging Heidi Rock's detention. The investigation could have completed without delay. In 
the event of an arrest, Heidi Rock could have been delivered to another officer responding to 
the scene (Id. at 13). In that manner, the detention would have taken no longer than necessary 
to effect the purpose of the stop and Officer Hurst's off-duty time would have terminated upon 
Officer Isakson's arrival at the scene thereby satisfying the Police Department's interest. 
vm. 
CONCLUSION 
The investigatory detention to determine whether Heidi Rock was operating a motor 
vehicle in violation of Utah's DUI statute took longer than necessary. Officer Hurst was trained 
and skilled in conducting field sobriety tests and should have continued conducting the 
investigation during which time Officer Isakson was heading to the scene. Officer Hurst could 
then have completed the investigation witout delay and either arrested or released her. If 
arrested, Heidi Rock could have been delivered to Officer Isakson without further involvement 
by Officer Hurst. In that manner, the investigatory detention of Heidi Rock would have been 
no longer than necessary. 
The reason given by Officer Hurst for the delay in the investigation was concern 
regarding overtime charges to the Police Department. However, Officer Hurst's actions in 
remaining at the scene for nearly one hour following Officer Isakson's arrival, and then 
performing the inventory search and impound of Ms. Rock's vehicle were inconsistent with the 
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the interests of the Police Department. The interests of the Police Department would have been 
best served by following the procedure described above. More importantly, the detention of 
Heidi Rock would not have been longer than necessary. 
The facts support a finding that Heidi Rock's constitutional rights as guaranteed under 
the United States and Utah Constitutions against unreasonable seizures were violated and require 
a reversal of the Trial Court's decision. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2J_ day of September, 1993. 
^>7 
itehel Zager / ) 
Attorney for Appellant ^—^ 
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Addendum Number 1 
Rule 26(2)(a) Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure (1989) 
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Rule 26. Appeals. 
(1) An appeal is taken by filing with the clerk of 
the court from which the appeal is taken a notice of 
appeal, stating the order or judgment appealed from, 
and by serving a copy of it on the adverse party or his 
attorney of record. Proof of service of the copy shall be 
filed with the court. 
(2) An appeal may be taken by the defendant from: 
(a) the final judgment of conviction, whether 
by verdict or plea; 
(b) an order made, after judgment, affecting 
the substantial rights of the defendant; 
(c) an interlocutory order when, upon petition 
for review, the appellate court decides that the 
appeal would be in the interest of justice; or 
(d) any order of the court judging the defen-
dant by reason of a mental disease or defect in-
competent to proceed further in a pending prose-
cution. 
(3) An appeal may be taken by the prosecution 
from: 
(a) a final judgment of dismissal; 
(b) an order arresting judgment; 
(c) an order terminating the prosecution be-
cause of a finding of double jeopardy or denial of 
a speedy trial; 
(d) a judgment of the court holding a statute or 
any part of it invalid; 
Addendum Number 2 
Judicial Code, Section 78-2a-3(2)(f) 
Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue 
all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and pro-
cess necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, 
and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from 
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies 
or appeals from the district court review of infor-
mal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, ex-
cept the Public Service Commission, State Tax 
Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of Oil, 
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of 
political subdivisions of the state or other lo-
cal agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under 
Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except 
those from the small claims department of a cir-
cuit court; 
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of 
record in criminal cases, except those involving a 
charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal 
cases, except those involving a conviction of a 
first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for ex-
traordinary writs sought by persons who are in-
carcerated or serving any other criminal sen-
tence, except petitions constituting a challenge to 
a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree 
or capital felony; 
Addendum Number 3 
The United States Constitution 
Fourth Amendment 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
AMENDMENT IV 
(Unreasonable searches and seizures.) 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Addendum Number 4 
The Utah State Constitution 
Article I, Section 14 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
ARTICLE 1, §14 
(Unreasonable searches forbidden - issuance of warrant.) 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the person or thing to be seized. 
Addendum Number 5 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 11 
Record on Appeal 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE Rule 11 
submitted to the court for consideration and an appropriate order. The time 
for taking other steps in the appellate procedure is suspended pending disposi-
tion of a motion to affirm or reverse or dismiss. 
(e) Ruling of court. The court, upon its own motion, and on such notice as 
it directs, may dismiss an appeal or petition for review if the court lacks 
jurisdiction; or may summarily affirm the judgment or order which is the 
subject of review, if it plainly appears that no substantial question is pre-
sented; or may summarily reverse in cases of manifest error. 
(f) Deferral of ruling. As to any issue raised by a motion for summary 
disposition, the court may defer its ruling until plenary presentation and 
consideration of the case. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS quate opportunity to present relevant argu-
ments and authorities. An appellate court's re-
Dismissal by court. jection of appellant's contentions as unmerito-
Summary affirmance.
 rious d o e 8 n o t d e n y him ^ right o f a p p e a L 
Time for filing. Hernandez v. Hayward, 764 P.2d 993 (Utah Ct. 
Dismissal by court App. 1988); State v. Palmer, 786 P.2d 248 
Appeal appropriate for summary disposition (Utah Ct App. 1990) (decided under former 
(i.e., dismissal) on court's own motion. See Rule 10, Utah R. Ct App.). 
Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230 (Utah Ct
 T i m e for fflift0> 
™" A motion for summary disposition that is 
Summary affirmance. clearly meritorious supports a suspension of 
Summary affirmance under this rule is a de- the time limitation contained in this rule. 
termination of the appeal on its merits, after Bailey v. Adams, 798 P.2d 1142 (Utah Ct. App. 
the parties have been afforded a full and ade- 1990). 
Rule 11. The record on appeal. 
(a) Composition of the record on appeal. The original papers and ex-
hibits filed in the trial court, the transcript of proceedings, if any, the index 
prepared by the clerk of the trial court, and where available the docket sheet, 
shall constitute the record on appeal in all cases. However, with respect to 
papers only those prescribed under paragraph (d) of this rule shall be trans-
mitted to the appellate court. 
(b) Pagination and indexing of record. Immediately upon filing of the 
notice of appeal, the clerk of the trial court shall paginate all of the original 
papers filed in that court in chronological order and shall prepare an alpha-
betical index of those papers. The index shall contain a reference to the date 
on which the paper was filed in the trial court and the starting page of the 
record on which the paper will be found. 
(c) Duty of appellant. After filing the notice of appeal, the appellant, or in 
the event that more than one appeal is taken, each appellant, shall comply 
with the provisions of paragraphs (d) and (e) of this rule and shall take any 
other action necessary to enable the clerk of the trial court to assemble and 
transmit the record. A single record shall be transmitted. 
(d) Papers and exhibits on appeal. 
(1) Criminal cases. All of the original papers in a criminal case shall 
be included by the clerk of the trial court as part of the record on appeal. 
(2) Civil cases. In all civil cases, the record shall remain in the custody 
of the clerk of the trial court, as set forth in Rule 12(b)(2), during prepara-
tion and filing of briefs. 
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Rule 11 UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
The clerk of the trial court shall establish rules and procedures for checking 
out the record, after pagination, for use by the parties in briefing. 
(A) Civil cases with short records. In civil cases where all the 
original papers total fewer than 300 pages, all of the original papers 
will be transmitted to the appellate court upon completion of the 
filing of briefs by the parties, as set forth in Rule 12(b)(2). In such 
cases, the appellant shall serve upon the clerk of the trial court, 
simultaneously with the filing of appellant's reply brief, notice of the 
date on which appellant's reply brief was filed. If appellant does not 
intend to file a reply brief, appellant shall notify the clerk of the trial 
court of that fact within 30 days of the filing of appellee's brief. 
(B) All other civil cases. In all other civil cases where the origi-
nal papers are or exceed 300 pages, all parties shall file with the 
clerk of the trial court, within 10 days after briefing is completed, a 
joint or separate designation of those papers referred to in their re-
spective briefs. Only those designated papers and the following, to 
the extent applicable, shall be transmitted to the clerk of the appel-
late court by the clerk of the trial court: 
(i) the pleadings as defined in Rule 7(a), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure; 
(ii) the pretrial order, if any; 
(iii) the final judgment, order, or interlocutory order from 
which the appeal is taken; 
(iv) other orders sought to be reviewed, if any; 
(v) any supporting opinion, findings of fact or conclusions of 
law filed or delivered by the trial court; 
(vi) the motion, response, and accompanying memoranda upon 
which the court rendered judgment, if any; 
(vii) jury instructions given, if any; 
(viii) jury verdicts and interrogatories, if any; 
(ix) the notice of appeal, 
(e) The transcript of proceedings; duty of appellant to order; notice 
to appellee if partial transcript is ordered. 
(1) Request for transcript; time for filing. Within 10 days after fil-
ing the notice of appeal, the appellant shall request from the reporter a 
transcript of such parts of the proceedings not already on file as the 
appellant deems necessary. The request shall be in writing, and, within 
the same period, a copy shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court and 
the clerk of the appellate court. If no such parts of the proceedings are to 
be requested, within the same period the appellant shall file a certificate 
to that effect with the clerk of the trial court and a copy with the clerk of 
the appellate court. If there was no reporter but the proceedings were 
otherwise recorded, the appellant shall request from a court transcriber, 
certified in accordance with the rules and procedures of the Judicial 
Council, a transcript of such parts of the proceeding not already on file as 
the appellant deems necessary. By stipulation of the parties approved by 
the appellate court, a person other than a certified court transcriber may 
transcribe a recorded hearing. The clerk of the appellate court shall, upon 
request, provide a list of all certified court transcribers. The transcriber is 
subject to all of the obligations imposed on reporters by these rules. 
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UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE Rule 11 
(2) Transcript required of all evidence regarding challenged 
finding or conclusion. If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a 
finding or conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the 
appellant shall include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant 
to such finding or conclusion. 
(3) Statement of issues; cross-designation by appellee. Unless the 
entire transcript is to be included, the appellant shall, within 10 days 
after filing the notice of appeal, file a statement of the issues that will be 
presented on appeal and shall serve on the appellee a copy of the request 
or certificate and a copy of the statement. If the appellee deems a tran-
script of other parts of the proceedings to be necessary, the appellee shall, 
within 10 days after the service of the request or certificate and the 
statement of the appellant, file and serve on the appellant a designation 
of additional parts to be included. Unless within 10 days after service of 
such designation the appellant has requested such parts and has so noti-
fied the appellee, the appellee may within the following 10 days either 
request the parts or move in the trial court for an order requiring the 
appellant to do so. 
(4) Payment of reporter. At the time of the request, a party shall 
make satisfactory arrangements with the reporter or transcriber for pay-
ment of the cost of the transcript. 
(f) Agreed statement as the record on appeal. In lieu of the record on 
appeal as defined in paragraph (a) of this rule, the parties may prepare and 
sign a statement of the case, showing how the issues presented by the appeal 
arose and were decided in the trial court and setting forth only so many of the 
facts averred and proved or sought to be proved as are essential to a decision 
of the issues presented. If the statement conforms to the truth, it, together 
with such additions as the trial court may consider necessary fully to present 
the issues raised by the appeal, shall be approved by the trial court. The clerk 
of the trial court shall transmit the statement to the clerk of the appellate 
court within the time prescribed by Rule 12(b)(2). The clerk of the trial court 
shall transmit the index of the record to the clerk of the appellate court upon 
approval of the statement by the trial court. 
(g) Statement of evidence or proceedings when no report was made 
or when transcript is unavailable. If no report of the evidence or proceed-
ings at a hearing or trial was made, or if a transcript is unavailable, the 
appellant may prepare a statement of the evidence or proceedings from the 
best available means, including recollection. The statement shall be served on 
the appellee, who may serve objections or propose amendments within 10 days 
after service. The statement and any objections or proposed amendments shall 
be submitted to the trial court for settlement and approval and, as settled and 
approved, shall be included by the clerk of the trial court in the record on 
appeal. 
(h) Correction or modification of the record. If any difference arises as 
to whether the record truly discloses what occurred in the trial court, the 
difference shall be submitted to and settled by that court and the record made 
to conform to the truth. If anything material to either party is omitted from 
the record by error or accident or is misstated, the parties by stipulation, the 
trial court, or the appellate court, either before or after the record is transmit-
ted, may direct that the omission or misstatement be corrected and if neces-
sary that a supplemental record be certified and transmitted. The moving 
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party, or the court if it is acting on its own initiative, shall serve on the parties 
a statement of the proposed changes. Within 10 days after service, any party 
may serve objections to the proposed changes. All other questions as to the 
form and content of the record shall be presented to the appellate court. 
Advisory Committee Note, — The rule is 
amended to make applicable m the Supreme 
Court a procedure of the Court of Appeals for 
preparing a transcript where the record is 
maintained by an electronic recording device. 
The mle is modified slightly from the former 
Court of Appeals rule to make it the appel-
lant's responsibility, not the clerk's responsi-
bility to arrange for the preparation of the 
transcript. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Correction or modification. 
—Supplemental record. 
Notice of transmission. 
Purpose. 
—Supplementation demed. 
Evidence. 
Incomplete record. 
Statement where transcript unavailable 
—Adequacy of rule's procedures. 
Right to appeal. 
Transcript. 
—Factual matters. 
—Purpose of rule. 
Cited. 
Correction or modification. 
—Supplemental record. 
In considering a motion to supplement the 
record, the appellate court should evaluate sev-
eral factors. These include the need for the sup-
plemental material, prior opportunity to intro-
duce the supplemental material, and length of 
the resulting delay. Under appropriate circum-
stances and in the interest of judicial economy, 
the court will deny a motion to supplement the 
record. Jeschke v. Willis, 793 P.2d 428 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990). 
The trial court properly supplemented the 
record with respect to the circumstances sur-
rounding the question of whether defendant 
waived his right to a jury trial, when the trial 
court had the parties submit proffers of evi-
dence m the form of affidavits to the trial judge 
stating the recollection each had of the circum-
stances surrounding the waiver. State v. 
Moosman, 794 P.2d 474 (Utah 1990). 
Notice of transmission. 
Although this rule does not require notice to 
the parties of transmittal of any supplemental 
records, it is advisable to give notice of any 
proposed action that may affect the parties' 
rights or responsive procedures. William C. 
Moore & Co. v. Sanchez, 6 Utah 2d 309, 313 
P.2d 461 (1957). 
Purpose. 
It is not improper for the Supreme Court to 
consider a supplemental record for purposes of 
determining if the trial court's ruling was sup-
ported by competent evidence Bawden & 
Assocs. v. Smith, 646 P.2d 711 (Utah 1982) 
—Supplementation denied. 
Supreme Court declined to permit supple-
mentation of the record to show that the objec-
tions required by Rule 51, U R.C P , were 
made, where the exact nature of the objections 
made was not clear, and the parties could not 
agree upon and the trial judge could not recall 
specific details of the proposed instructions 
that were rejected or modified. Hansen v Stew-
art, 761 P.2d 14 (Utah 1988). 
Evidence. 
In essence, this rule directs counsel to pro-
vide the appellate court with all evidence rele-
vant to the issues raised on appeal. Sampson v 
Richms, 770 P.2d 998 (Utah Ct. App ), cert 
denied, 776 P.2d 916 (Utah 1989). 
Because counsel failed to provide the Court 
of Appeals with all relevant evidence bearing 
on the issues raised on appeal, as required by 
Subdivision (e)(2), the court could only pre-
sume that the judgment was supported by suf-
ficient evidence. State v. Nine Thousand One 
Hundred Ninety-Nine Dollars, 791 P2d 213 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990); Intermountain Power 
Agency v. Bowers-Irons Recreation Land & 
Cattle Co., 786 P.2d 250 (Utah Ct. App 1990) 
Incomplete record. 
If the record before the Court of Appeals is 
incomplete, the court is unable to review the 
evidence as a whole and must therefore pre-
sume that the verdict was supported by admis-
sible and competent evidence. Sampson v 
Richms, 770 P.2d 998 (Utah Ct. App ), cert 
denied, 776 P.2d 916 (Utah 1989); Horton v 
Gem State Mut., 794 P.2d 847 (Utah Ct App 
1990). 
Statement where transcript unavailable. 
—Adequacy of rule's procedures. 
Right to appeal. 
To prove that the loss of the reporter's notes 
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from an earlier hearing effectively denied an matters without a transcript of the testimony. 
appellant his constitutional right to appeal the Sawyers v. Sawyers, 558 P.2d 607 (Utah 1976). 
judgment of that hearing, the appellant must —Purpose of rule. 
show that the procedures provided by this rule x ^
 p u r p o s e 0f this rule is to avoid the 
for reconstructing and settling the record are court's attempting to recreate, based upon con-
inadequate. Emig v. Hayward, 703 P.2d 1043 flkting testimony of counsel, what oral argu-
(Utah 1985). ments were made by counsel at a law and mo-
tion hearing. Guardian State Bank v. Hum-
Transcript phreys, 762 P.2d 1084 (Utah 1988). 
—Factual matters. Cited in Prudential Capital Group Co. v. 
The Supreme Court cannot resolve or under- Mattson, 148 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 (Ct. App. 
take to determine appeals involving factual 1990). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 4 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and ity prior to transcribing notes as grounds for 
Error §§ 397 to 544. reversal or new trial, 57 A.L.R.4th 1049. 
C.J.S. — 4A C J.S. Appeal and Error §§ 680 Key Numbers. — Appeal and Error «= 493 
to 1216. et seq. 
A.L.R. — Court reporter's death or disabil-
Rule 12. Transmission of the record. 
(a) Duty of reporter to prepare and file transcript; notice to appellate 
court. Upon receipt of a request for a transcript, the reporter shall file with 
the clerk of the appellate court an acknowledgment that the request has been 
received, the date of its receipt, the date on which the reporter expects to file 
the transcript, and whether satisfactory arrangements for payment have been 
made. The transcript shall be completed within 30 days of receipt of the 
request. The reporter may file a motion for an enlargement of time with the 
clerk of the appellate court. The clerk of the appellate court may grant an 
enlargement of time upon a showing by the reporter of good cause. The re-
porter shall give notice of the motion for enlargement of time to the parties. 
The clerk of the appellate court shall enter the decision upon the motion in the 
docket and notify the parties. In the event of the failure of the reporter to file 
the transcript within the time allowed, the clerk of the appellate court shall 
notify the trial court judge and take such other steps as may be directed by the 
appellate court, including but not limited to an order relieving the reporter of 
all regular duties until such time as the transcript is completed. Upon comple-
tion of the transcript, the reporter shall file it with the clerk of the trial court 
and shall notify the clerk of the appellate court that the transcript has been 
filed. 
(b) Transmittal of record on appeal to appellate court; duty of trial 
court clerk* 
(1) Duty of trial court clerk in criminal cases. In criminal cases, all 
of the original papers and the index prepared pursuant to Rule 1Kb) will 
be transmitted by the clerk of the trial court to the clerk of the appellate 
court upon completion of the transcript under paragraph (a) above or, if 
there is no transcript, within 20 days of the filing of the notice of appeal. 
(2) Duty of trial court clerk in civil cases. In civil cases, unless 
otherwise ordered by the appellate court, the record shall remain in the 
custody of the trial court clerk during the preparation and filing of briefs. 
When the transcript is completed pursuant to paragraph (a) above, the 
clerk of the trial court shall immediately transmit a certified copy of the 
Addendum Number 6 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24 
Requirements of Appellant's Brief 
Rule 24 UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
Any party may file a response in opposition to a motion within 10 days after 
service of the motion; however, the court may, for good cause shown, dispense 
with, shorten or extend the time for responding to any motion, 
(b) Determination of motions for procedural orders. Notwithstanding 
the provisions of paragraph (a) of this rule as to motions generally, motions 
for procedural orders which do not substantially affect the rights of the parties 
or the ultimate disposition of the appeal, including any motion under Rule 
22(b), may be acted upon at any time, without awaiting a response. Pursuant 
to rule or order of the court, motions for specified types of procedural orders 
may be disposed of by the clerk. The court may review a disposition by the 
clerk upon motion of a party or upon its own motion. 
(c) Power of a single justice or judge to entertain motions. In addition 
to the authority expressly conferred by these rules or by law, a single justice 
or judge of the court may entertain and may grant or deny any request for 
relief which under these rules may properly be sought by motion, except that 
a single justice or judge may not dismiss or otherwise determine an appeal or 
other proceeding, and except that the court may provide by order or rule that 
any motion or class of motions must be acted upon by the court. The action of a 
single justice or judge may be reviewed by the court. 
(d) Form of papers; number of copies. 
(1) Except for motions to enlarge time, five copies shall be filed with 
the original in the Supreme Court, and four copies shall be filed with the 
original in the Court of Appeals, but the court may require that addi-
tional copies be furnished. Only the original of a motion to enlarge time 
shall be filed. 
(2) Motions and other papers shall be typewritten on opaque, unglazed 
paper 8V2 by 11 inches in size. The text shall be in type not smaller than 
ten characters per inch. Lines of text shall be double spaced and shall be 
upon one side of the paper only. Consecutive sheets shall be attached at 
the upper left margin. 
(3) A motion or other paper shall contain a caption setting forth the 
name of the court, the title of the case, the docket number, and a brief 
descriptive title indicating the purpose of the paper. The attorney shall 
sign all papers filed with the court with his or her individual name. The 
attorney shall give his or her business address, telephone number, and 
Utah State Bar number in the upper left hand corner of the first page of 
every paper filed with the court except briefs. A party who is not repre-
sented by an attorney shall sign any paper filed with the court and state 
the party's address and telephone number. 
Rule 24. Briefs. 
(a) Brief of the appellant The brief of the appellant shall contain under 
appropriate headings and in the order indicated: 
(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or 
agency whose judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where 
the caption of the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties. 
The list should be set out on a separate page which appears immediately 
inside the cover. 
(2) A table of contents, with page references. 
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(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with 
parallel citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with refer-
ences to the pages of the brief where they are cited. 
(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court. 
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review and the standard of 
appellate review for each issue with supporting authority for each issue. 
(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regula-
tions whose interpretation is determinative shall be set out verbatim with 
the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, 
the citation alone will suffice, and in that event, the provision shall be set 
forth as provided in paragraph (f) of this rule. 
(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly 
the nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the 
court below. A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for 
review shall follow. All statements of fact and references to the proceed-
ings below shall be supported by citations to the record (see paragraph 
fe)). 
(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably 
paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually 
made in the body of the brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the 
heading under which the argument is arranged. 
(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and rea-
sons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, with citations 
to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. 
(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought. 
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the 
requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, except that a statement of the 
issues or of the case need not be made unless the appellee is dissatisfied with 
the statement of the appellant. 
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the 
appellee, and if the appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief 
in reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the cross-
appeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in 
the opposing brief. No further briefs may be filed except with leave of the 
appellate court. 
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their 
briefe and oral arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such 
designations as "appellant" and "appellee". It promotes clarity to use the 
designations used in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the 
actual names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the 
injured person," "the taxpayer," etc. 
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the 
pages of the original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 1Kb), to pages of 
the reporter's transcript, or to pages of any statement of the evidence or 
proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). 
References to exhibits shall include exhibit numbers. If reference is made to 
evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, reference shall be made 
to the pages of the transcript at which the evidence was identified, offered, 
and received or rejected. 
Rule 24 UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
(f) Reproduction of opinions, statutes, rules, regulations, documents, 
etc. 
(1) Any opinion, memorandum of decision, findings of fact, conclusions 
of law, or order pertaining to the issues on appeal and any jury instruc-
tions or other part of the record of central importance to the determina-
tion of the appeal shall be reproduced in the brief or in an addendum to 
the brief 
(2) If determination of the issues presented requires the study of stat-
utes, rules, regulations, etc., or relevant parts thereof, to the extent not 
set forth under subparagraph (a)(6) of this rule, they shall be reproduced 
in the brief or in an addendum at the end, or they may be supplied to the 
court in pamphlet form. 
(g) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs 
shall not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive 
of pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any adden-
dum containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as re-
quired by paragraph (f) of this rule. 
(h) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the 
party first filing a notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant for the 
purposes of this rule and Rule 26, unless the parties otherwise agree or the 
court otherwise orders. The brief of the appellee shall contain the issues and 
arguments involved in the cross-appeal as well as the answer to the brief of 
the appellant. 
(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases 
involving more than one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated 
for purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and 
any appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of 
another. Parties may similarly join in reply briefs. 
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant 
authorities come to the attention of a party after that party's brief has been 
filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise 
the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations. An origi-
nal letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original 
letter and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a 
reference either to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the 
citations pertain, but the letter shall without argument state the reasons for 
the supplemental citations. Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing 
and shall be similarly limited. 
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be con-
cise, presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and 
free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs 
which are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua 
sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the offend-
ing lawyer. 
(1) Brief covers. The covers of all briefs shall be of heavy cover stock and 
shall comply with Rule 27. 
Advisory Committee Note. — The brief peal, a statement of the applicable standard of 
must now contain for each issue raised on ap- review and citation of supporting authority. 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutional arguments. 
Contents. 
—Inappropriate language. 
—Issues raised. 
Reply brief. 
—Statement of facts with citation to record. 
Failure to contain. 
Failure to file. 
—Defective appeal. 
Properly documented argument. 
Cited. 
Constitutional arguments. 
In order to make an argument for an innova-
tive interpretation of a state constitutional 
provision textually similar to a federal provi-
sion, the following points should be developed 
and supported with authority and analysis. 
First, counsel should offer analysis of the 
unique context in which Utah's constitution 
developed with regard to the issue at hand. 
Second, counsel should demonstrate that state 
appellate courts regularly interpret even 
textually similar state constitutional provi-
sions in a manner different from federal inter-
pretations of the United States Constitution 
and that it is entirely proper to do so in our 
federal system. Third, citation should be made 
to authority from other states supporting the 
particular construction urged by counsel. State 
v. Bobo, 149 Utah Adv. Rep. 67 (Ct. App. 1990). 
Contents. 
A brief must contain some support for eac 
contention. State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960 N 
(Utah 1989); State v. Reiners, 151 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 17 (Ct. App. 1990). 
—Inappropriate language. 
Derogatory references to others or inappro-
priate language of any kind has no place in an 
appellate brief and is of no assistance in at-
tempting to resolve any legitimate issues pre-
sented on appeal. State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296 
(Utah 1986). 
—Issues raised. 
Reply brief. 
As a general rule, an issue raised initially in 
a reply brief will not be considered on appeal, 
although the court, in its discretion, may de-
cided a case upon any points that its proper 
disposition may require, even if first raised in 
a reply brief. Romrell v. Zions First Nat'l 
Bank, 611 P.2d 392 (Utah 1980). 
—Statement of facts with citation to 
record. 
Failure to contain. 
The Supreme Court need not, and will not, 
consider any facts not properly cited to, or sup-
ported by, the record. Uckerman v. Lincoln 
Nat l Life Ins. Co., 588 P.2d 142 (Utah 1978). 
The Supreme Court will assume the correct-
ness of the judgment in a criminal trial if coun-
sel on appeal does not comply with the require-
ments as to making a concise statement of 
facts and citation of the pages in the record 
where they are supported. State v. Tucker, 657 
P.2d 755 (Utah 1982). 
If a party fails to make a concise statement 
of the facts and citation of the pages in the 
record where those facts are supported, the 
court will assume the correctness of the judg-
ment below. Koulis v. Standard Oil Co., 746 
P.2d 1182 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Fail cfBle. 
-Defective appeal. 
Where defendant was convicted of operating 
a motor vehicle without insurance, and 'at-
tempted to file his appeal pro se, but failed to 
file a brief or submit a transcript of the record, 
there was no reversible error presented which 
\would permit the appellate court to reverse the 
judgment. State v Hanspnf 540_R2d 935 (Utah 
1975). " " ^ ' 
Properly documented argument. 
Brief that was filled with burdensome, emo-
tional, immaterial and inaccurate arguments 
did not set forth a properly documented argu-
ment as required by this rule; therefore the 
court disregarded it. Koulis v. Standard Oil 
Co., 746 P.2d 1182 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Cited in Weber v. Snyderville West, 146 
Utah Adv. Rep. 40 (Ct. App. 1990). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and 
Error §§ 684 to 690. 
C.J.S. — 5 CJ.S. Appeal and Error § 1311 
et seq. 
Key Numbers. 
to 807. 
— Appeal and Error <*= 755 
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Addendum Number 7 
Decision denying Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress Evidence in a DUI Case 
THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
Salt Lake City Corp, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
Heidi Rock, 
Defendant 
Decision 
Case No. 925020755TC 
The time for further responsive memorandum in the above entitled case having 
expired, the court now renders its decision on defendant's motion to suppress and dismiss. 
On the motion to suppress, the court finds that the detention of the defendant 
in order to wait for an on-duty officer to complete the investigation was not unreasonable. It 
served valid public interests and did not unreasonably detain the defendant. The motion to 
suppress is therefore denied. 
On the motion to dismiss the charge of open container, the fact that the officer 
destroyed the alleged alcohol and its container would go to the weight, not the admissibility 
of the evidence, and the defendant is not unduly prejudiced by the destruction. The motion 
to dismiss is accordingly denied. 
The matter is set for Jury Trial on the 19th of May at 9:00 a. m. No further notice 
will be provided. 
DATED this y£<^ day of April, 1993. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Decision was mailed 
to : 
TODD J. GODFREY 
ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION 
451 South 200 East # 125 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and 
MR MITCHELL ZAGER 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
3587 West 4700 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118 
on the /J?*^ day of April, 1993 
a lu+*l 
Addendum Number 8 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence 
in a DUI Case along with Supporting 
Points & Authorities 
MITCHEL ZAGER - 3968 
Attorney for Defendant 
3587 West 4700 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118 
Telephone: 801-964-6100 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, j MOTION TO SUPRESS EVIDENCE 
IN DUI CHARGE AND MOTION TO 
DISMISS OPEN CONTAINER CHARGE 
Plaintiff, | 
v . I 
HEIDI ROCK, | Case No. 925020755 TC 
Defendant. | 
COMES NOW, the defendant, HEIDI ROCK, by and through her attorney of record, 
MITCHEL ZAGER, and hereby moves this Honorable Court to supress all evidence after the 
unreasonable and unlawful detention of HEIDI ROCK on the grounds that she was illegally 
detained after performing field tests for Officer Jed Hurst; and on the basis that her 
constitutional rights as guaranteed by the United States Constitution, Fourth Amendment, as well 
as Article 1, §14 of the Utah Constitution were violated thereby. Defendant further moves this 
court to dismiss the charge of open container on the basis that the State has destroyed all tangible 
evidence of the alleged charge. 
Based upon the Motion, Points and Authorities, and surrounding circumstances, and in 
the interest of the furtherance of justice, defendant's motion should be granted. 
Defendant requests that oral argument be set in this matter. 
DATED this V7_ day of November, 1992. 
fezc 
ITCHEL ZAGER 
Attorney for Defendant 
The undersigned certifies that a copy of the Motion to Suppress Evidence in D.U.I. 
Charge and MOtion to Dismiss Open Container Charge was sent via U.S. mail, postage pre-
paid, this 3*1 day of November 1992, to the following: Salt Lake City Prosecutor, 451 So. 
200 East, Room 125, Salt Lake City, UT 84111. 
0M^CCL4 &U^C£J 
Cindy Bruce 
MITCHEL ZAGER - 3968 
Attorney for Defendant 
3587 West 4700 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118 
Telephone: 801-964-6100 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, j POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Plaintiff, j EVIDENCE IN D.U.I. CHARGE AND 
DISMISS OPEN CONTAINER CHARGE 
v . I 
HEIDI ROCK, | Case No. 925020755 TC 
Defendant. I 
COMES NOW the defendant, by and through her attorney, MITCHEL ZAGER, and in 
support of her motion to suppress evidence in a D.U.I, charge and dismiss open container 
charge, states as follows: 
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On or about July 19, 1992, defendant HEIDI ROCK was stopped by Officer Hurst 
for allegedly having no headlights on but only her parking lights on. See supplemental report 
of Officer Hurst attached hereto as Exhibit 1. 
2. HEIDI ROCK, according to Officer Hurst, had bloodshot eyes and a "faint" odor of 
alcohol. See Exhibit 1 attached hereto. 
3. HEIDI ROCK was required by Officer Hurst to perform two (2) field tests. 
Following her performance of the two field tests, Officer Hurst was unable to assess whether 
HEIDI ROCK ... "was impaired or not." See Exhibit 1 attached hereto. 
4. HEIDI ROCK returned to her vehicle and was ready to leave, but was prevented from 
doing so. 
5. HEIDI ROCK continued to be detained by Officer Hurst for approximately twenty-
three minutes from the time of the stop until Officer Isakson arrived at the scene. Officer 
Isakson required HEIDI ROCK to perform four (4) additional field tests and stated that HEIDI 
ROCK had a strong odor of alcohol about her person. Following the field tests, HEIDI ROCK 
was placed under arrest. See Exhibit 1 attached hereto. 
6. The Officers allege that a half-full pint bottle of vodka was found behind the driver's 
seat on the floor, which at inventory was found to be a one-quarter full pint bottle of vodka. 
The bottle of vodka alleged by the officers was subsequently destroyed and is presently not in 
evidence. 
7. HEIDI ROCK, who had no previous offenses of any kind, was arrested for D.U.I, 
and open container. 
II. 
THE OFFICER'S CONTINUED DETENTION OF HEIDI ROCK FOLLOWING 
HER PERFORMANCE OF FIELD TESTS WAS UNREASONABLE AND IN 
VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION, AS WELL AS ARTICLE I §14 OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION. 
The defendant HEIDI ROCK was detained longer than was reasonable in this instance 
in violation of both the United States Constitution Fourth Amendment and Article I §14 of the 
Utah Constitution. HEIDI ROCK allegedly was stopped for having her parking lights on instead 
of her headlights. Following her performance of field tests, Officer Hurst was unable to 
conclude with probable cause that she was impaired (see Exhibit 1 attached hereto). In State v. 
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conclude with probable cause that she was impaired (see Exhibit 1 attached hereto). In State v. 
Marshall, the Utah Court of Appeals stated: 
"The United States Supreme Court has not chosen to define a bright-line rule as to the 
acceptable length of a detention because "common sense" and ordinary human experience must 
govern over rigid criteria." State v. Marshall 791 P.2d 880,884 (Utah App. 1990), citing 
United States v. Sharp. 470 U.S. 675, 685, 105 S.Ct. 1568,1575 (1985). 
The Marshall court went on to say that the length of the detention is one factor as well 
as whether the police investigation was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly during 
which time it was necessary to detain the defendant. IcL In the instant case, Officer Hurst, a 
trained law enforcement official, following his trained observations of the defendant's driving 
pattern, her person, her speech and her performance on field tests, he did not believe he had 
enough evidence to establish probable cause to arrest HEIDI ROCK for driving under the 
influence of alcohol. The continued detention of HEIDI ROCK to perform the same and 
additional field tests by another officer, was unreasonable and'not likely to confirm nor dispel 
their suspicions whether HEIDI ROCK was impaired. Officer Isakson had no greater training 
and, in fact, had less insight concerning HEIDI ROCK'S condition, having not observed her 
driving pattern. Having another officer re-test the defendant did not add any evidence that 
Officer Hurst had not gathered through his investigation. The repeat testing of HEIDI ROCK 
by another officer did not further the investigation. It simply substituted one officer's opinion 
for another. Thus, the continued detention of HEIDI ROCK was unreasonable and did not 
further the investigation. Following her performance of field tests for Officer Hurst HEIDI 
ROCK should have been released. Her continued detention violated both the Utah and United 
States Constitutions as cited and all evidence obtained following the unreasonable detention of 
HEIDI ROCK as stated must be suppressed. 
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III. 
THE STATE DESTROYED ALL EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE CHARGE 
OF OPEN CONTAINER AND, THEREFORE, THE CHARGE MUST BE 
DISMISSED. 
The officers destroyed all alleged tangible evidence of an open container of alcohol in 
the vehicle thereby preventing HEIDI ROCK from obtaining that evidence and testing it to 
determine whether in fact an open container of alcohol was in her vehicle. Without this 
evidence HEIDI ROCK cannot effectively cross-examine, test, nor examine the evidence, and 
as such it violates her due process rights under the United States and Utah Constitution. 
The impoundment of the vehicle was also improper since the vehicle could have been 
legally parked or removed by the licensed passengers in the vehicle. The impound and 
subsequent inventory search without warrant were impermissible. Therefore, the charge of open 
container must be dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MITCHEL ZAGER 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
The undersigned certifies that a copy of the Points and Authorities in Support of Motion 
to Suppress Evidence in a D.U.I. Charge and Dismiss Open Container Charge was sent via U.S. 
mail, postage pre-paid, thisy / day of November 1992, to the following: Salt Lake City 
Prosecutor, 451 So. 200 East, Room 125, Salt Lake City, UT 84111. 
Cindy Bruce " 
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SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT - SR CASE 92-0777?; 
NCIC ! PRIMARY OFFFNSF 
i 
5404 ! DUI/ALCOHOL 
CLASSCTN ! FELONY? 
CHANGE? ! 
NO ! NO 
ADDRESS OF OCCURRENCE 
2 4 -} W 100 S 
! NCIC ! SECONDARY OFFENSE 
I 
( 
OCCURRED 
DATF TIME DAY 
07/1.9/92 02; 15 SUN 
DATE ! CASE NO, 
REPORTED ! 
07/26/92 ! 92-077792 
APT COUNCIL 
DETAILS FIELD - DF CASE 92-077792 
A/P MADE A RIGHT TURN ONTO WEST TEMPLE FROM 500 S. NORTHBOUND SHE 
TMTfi THE INSIDE LANE. THE VEHICLE HAD NO HEADLIGHTS ON? PARK LIGHTS 
A/P HAD BLOODSHOT GLAZED 
HER. A/P ASKED ME REPEATED 
FOR THE STOP AS MANY TIMES 
ONE POINT AS IF TO LEAVE 
I ASKED A/P TO PERFORM TWO 
WERE ON* I STOPPED THF VEHICLE A/P WAS DRIVING* 
EYKS AMD THERE WAS A FAINT ODOR OF ALCOHOL FROM 
I. Y WHY I STOPPED. I FXPIAINED TO HER THE REASON 
AS A/P ASKED. A/P WAS GOING TO START THE CAR AT 
WHILE I WAS STILL 1H THE STREET TALKING TO HER. 
FSK'S FOR ME. A/F'S ABILITY TO FOLLOW MY INSTRUCTIONS WAS POOR, SHE 
PERFORMED TFST DURING INSTRUCTION. ATTENTION SPAN WAS SHORT* KEPT ASKING 
HE WHAT I WANTED HER TO DO AS I WAS EXPLAINING AND DEMONSTRATING TESTS TO 
HER. 
TEST 5-1 i H.G.N. EARLY ANGLE OF ONSET? JERKY PURSUIT. TEST t2l HAND 
SLAP. A/P WAS UNABLE TO PERFORMED AT ALL WITHOUT HULT1 PLE SLAPS PER SIDE. I WAS OFF DUTY AND I NEEDED TO ASSESS A/P'S IF 
WAS IMPAIRED OR NOT.IF S0> I WOULD NEFD AND ON DUTY CAR TO HANDLE THE 
ARREST SO AS TO KEEP O.T. TO A MINIMUM. 
ON DUTY OFFICER ISAKSON WAS DISPATCHED TO MY LOCATION AND MADE 
A/P 
INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENTS OF A/P WITH FST'S WHICH I WITNESSED. A/P WAS PRO 
OESSED BY OFFICER ISAKSON. I IMPOUNDED A/P'S CAR. DURING THE INVENTORY I 
FOUND AN OPEN 1/4-FULL PINT BOTTLE OF VODKA IN A PAPER SACK WHICH WAS L.OCA 
TED BEHIND THE DRIVER'S SEAT ON THE FLOOR. 
OFFICER INFORMATION FIELD - OF r faq p 0 0-077792 
ID MO./DIV 
G52 
REPORT STATUS 
CASE CLOSED? 
! REPORTING OFFICER 
! HURST 7 JED 
! CLEARANCE: 
! EXCEPT? UNF? ARRFST? 
RECEIVED IN RECORDS 
DATE TIME 
07/22/92 20:3 7 
ASSISTING OFFICERS ID NO./DIV, 
AGE GROUP: 
ADULT? JUVFNILE? 
COMPUTER ENTRY ID 
62ER 
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Addendum Number 9 
Transcript of Hearing on 3/18/93, pages 
6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 19, 20, 22 
1 A The night involved in this situation. 
2 Q Can you tell us what happened that night. 
3 A I was driving on West Temple southbound 
4 approaching Fifth South. 
5 Q Were you on duty? 
5 A No, I was off duty. I was in my patrol 
7 vehicle in uniform. I saw the defendant's car making a 
3 turn off of Fifth South onto West Temple going northbound, 
9 made a wide turn into the inside lane, had no headlights 
10 on. I decided to stop the car and see what the problem 
H was and why the headlights weren't on. 
12 Q Why did you stop the car? 
13 A Because of the wide turn and no headlights. 
14 Q You were off duty though, correct? 
15 A Yes. 
16 Q So what did you do when you decided to stop 
17 the car? 
1Q A She pulled up to Fourth South and made a 
19 left turn onto Fourth South off of West Temple. As soon 
20 as she completed that turn I was right behind her. I 
2i initiated my emergency lights to indicate that I wanted 
22 her vehicle to pull over which didn't happen clear until 
23 just before Third West on Fourth South. 
24 Q And what happened once the car did stop? 
25 A She pulled the car over. I approached the 
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1 vehicle on the driver's side, asked for her drivers 
2 license. She asked me why I had stopped her. I explained 
3 the reasons and then she asked me several times while I 
4 was talking to her why I had stopped her even as I was 
5 explaining indicating that there was some problem with her 
6 understanding me. I decided because I smelled alcohol 
7 from the car, decided that perhaps she was intoxicated and 
8 had her exit the car and had her perform two field 
9 sobriety tests. 
10 Q What tests did you ask her to perform? 
H A Horizontal gaze nystagmus and hand slap. 
12 Q How did she do on those tests? 
13 A She did poorly on both of them. 
14 Q What did you do at that point? 
15 A I called for an on duty car to come and 
15 take care of the arrest portion of the DUI. 
17 Q Why did you call for an on duty car. 
18 A Because I was off duty and we had recently 
19 had a policy that if an on duty car could handle a problem 
20 that an off duty car is handling that's what they want us 
2i to do. 
22 Q How long had that policy been in place at 
23 this time? 
24 A I'm not sure. Probably about two or three 
25 m o n t h s . 
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1 Q Had you been on duty at all that day? 
2 A Yeah, earlier that day I had been on duty. 
3 Q How long had you been off duty? 
4 A Uh, about four hours, I think. I had been 
5 working a part time job prior to leaving — prior to my 
$ contact with her. I was just leaving my part time job. 
7 Q Where was that? 
3 A That was at City Centre at Fourth South and 
9 State Street. 
IQ Q Once you made the call for another on duty 
H car, how long was it before another officer responded? 
12 A To the best of my recollection it was about 
13 five or ten minutes. 
14 Q And who was the officer who responded? 
15 A Officer Isaacson. 
15 Q What did you observe after Officer Isaacson 
17 responded? 
13 A Officer Isaacson performed some field 
19 sobriety tests or had the defendant perform some field 
20 sobriety tests for him. 
2i Q Did he duplicate any of the tests you had 
22 done? 
23 A I believe so. 
24 Q Did you instruct him to do that? 
25 A No I did not. 
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1 Q Did you inform him at any time that you had 
2 already conducted those tests? 
3 A Yeah, I told him that I had conducted a 
4 couple of field sobriety tests. 
5 Q Do you recall if you told him specifically 
6 which tests? 
7 A I don't recall specifically. 
8 Q What time did you leave the scene of the 
9 stop? 
10 A I think it was close to 3:00 o'clock once 
H the car had been impounded and taken away from there. 
12 Q How long was that after you made the 
13 initial stop? 
14 A The initial stop was probably made at 2:05, 
15 2:10, somewhere in that area. 
15 Q When Officer Isaacson got to the scene, 
17 what did you tell him? 
IB A I told him the reason that I had stopped 
19 her and the reason that I had called him was that I had 
20 performed a couple of field sobriety tests and I felt that 
2i she was impaired and shouldn't be driving. 
22 Q Why didn't you just arrest her at that 
23 point? 
24 A Well, because it would have taken probably 
25 2 1/2 to 3 hours for the completion of the process — the 
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intoxilyzer tests and paperwork and booking and jail. 
impound 
bottle 
quarter 
behind 
it? 
bottle. 
object 
bottle. 
foundat 
bottle 
Q 
of the 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Did you have anything to do with the 
car? 
Yes, I did. 
Did you personally perform the impound? 
Yes, I did. 
Did you find anything during that impound? 
During the inventory search I found a 
of vodka that had about a quarter — was about a 
full. 
Q 
A 
Was the bottle open or closed? 
The lid was on. It was in a paper sack 
the driver's seat. 
Q 
A 
to the 
That1 
.ion. 
Q 
did you 
A 
What did you do with that when you found 
I dumped out the vodka and disposed of the 
MR. ZAGER: Your Honor, I am going to 
conclusion that there was vodka in the 
s the issue. There needs to be a 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
(By Mr. Godfrey) When you opened the 
smell anything? 
Yes, I did. 
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1 BY MR. ZAGER: 
2 Q How long have you been a police officer? 
3 A About eleven years. 
4 Q Have you ever heard of a hand off arrest? 
5 A Excuse me. 
6 Q A hand off arrest? 
7 A No. 
8 Q Familiar with that term? 
9 A No. 
10 Q Wouldn't you have been able to arrest Heidi 
11 Rock and then when another officer came on the scene 
12 deliver the suspect to that officer. 
13 A Yes, I could have. 
14 Q But you didn't do that on this occasion? 
15 A No. 
16 Q Have you received training in making DUI 
17 arrests? 
18 A Yes. 
19 Q Where have you received that training? 
20 A Post academy. 
2i Q Were you taught how to give field tests to 
22 your suspects? 
23 A Yes. 
24 Q And you were taught how t o a s se s s t h e 
25 subject's performance on those tests? 
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1 decided that I was going to arrest her with the 
2 information I had* 
3 Q Maybe I could elicit some help from the 
4 court. I'm having a problem understanding whether the 
5 officer following the performance of the two tests 
6 believed that he could arrest her or not. I think that's 
7 a straightforward question. 
8 THE COURT: My understanding is he didn't 
9 believe he had enough probable cause after two field tests 
10 for an arrest. His usual practice is to give four or five 
11 tests. 
12 Q Okay. Now, you were trained to give more 
13 tests to Heidi Rock and yo.u could — and she didn't refuse 
14 to perform any further tests for you? 
15 A Correct. 
16 Q And so after the two tests you could have 
17 easily asked her to perform a third and a fourth and a 
18 fifth test and made your determination without delay as to 
19 whether or not she was under the influence of alcohol, now 
20 is that correct? 
21 A I could have, but I didn't want to. 
22 Q We'll get to whether you wanted to or not 
23 but you had the skill and the ability and the training to 
24 do that? 
25 A T h a t ' s c o r r e c t . 
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1 Q The only reason that you needed to call in 
2 a second officer was to reduce the overtime pay to your 
3 department? 
4 A True, 
5 Q And she was detained for that period of 
6 time where she basically — you and she waited for another 
7 officer to arrive at the scene? 
8 A True. 
9 Q And during that time there was no 
10 investigation that took place, there was no further field 
Xi tests while you waited for Officer Isaacson? 
12 A No, there were no more. 
13 Q Now, was Heidi Rock free to leave while you 
14 were waiting for Officer Isaacson to arrive? 
15 A No, she was not. 
15 Q Now did you stick around and watch Heidi 
17 Rock perform the field tests for Officer Isaacson? 
18 A Yes, I did. 
19 Q And I believe your testimony was that some 
20 of the tests that you had her perform he repeated? 
21 A I don't recall. 
22 Q Well, didn't you do a gaze nystagmus test? 
23 A Yes, I did. 
24 Q Didn't Officer Isaacson have her do a gaze 
25 nys tagmus t e s t ? 
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1 A No. If I was on duty, yes* 
2 Q Well, that's what I meant. 
3 A If I were on duty I would have had to form 
4 my opinion with only those tests which she gave me. 
5 Q Regardless of your opinion as to whether 
5 she was intoxicated or not, you wouldn't have arrested her 
7 in this situation because you were off duty? 
8 A If another officer was unable to respond to 
9 my location and I was given that information, I would have 
10 done the arrest myself but since one was able to come and 
H there was no need for me to incur any extra overtime then 
12 I had another one come. 
13 Q And I understand it's your testimony that 
14 it was about ten to fifteen minutes period of time it took 
15 Officer Isaacson to arrive at the scene? 
15 A I think I said five to ten minutes. 
17 Q Okay. Five to ten minutes is now your 
18 testimony on how long you waited. As long as ten minutes. 
19 A I think that's what I said. 
20 THE COURT: That was his original 
2i testimony, five to ten minutes. 
22 MR. ZAGER: I guess I'm referring back to 
23 our discussion in the hall, but somewhere in the 
24 neighborhood of ten minutes is the detention period while 
25 you waited for Officer — 
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Addendum Number 10 
Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress Evidence 
Todd J. Godfrey #6094 
Assistant City Prosecutor 
Salt Lake City Corporation 
451 South 200 East, #125 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY CORP., | 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ! 
HEIDI ROCK, ] 
Defendant. ] 
RESPONSE 
1 SUPPRESS 
I DISMISS 
1 Case No. 
TO MOTION 
AND MOTION 
925020755 
TO 
TO 
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 19, 1992, Defendant Heidi rock was stopped by Officer 
Jedd Hurst of the Salt Lake City Police Department when Officer 
Hurst observed her driving her car without headlights. Officer 
Hurst was off-duty, in uniform, at the time of the stop. Officer 
Hurst noted a faint odor of alcohol and bloodshot eyes when he 
contacted Defendant. 
Due to his observations of Defendant's physical condition and 
her apparent mental state, Officer Hurst asked Defendant to perform 
two field sobriety tests. Based on Defendant's performance on the 
tests, Officer Hurst formed the opinion that Defendant was under 
the influence of alcohol. 
Upon forming that opinion, Officer Hurst called for an on-duty 
Officer to respond and handle what Officer Hurst believed would 
ripen into an arrest for a DUI. Within five to ten minutes of the 
call from Officer Hurst, Officer Rusty Isaakson of the SLCPD 
responded. Officer Isaakson requested Defendant perform field 
tests so that he could make an independent assessment of 
Defendant's condition. Two of the tests requested by Officer Hurst 
were also requested by Officer Isaakson. 
Following Defendant's performance of the tests, Officer 
Isaakson arrested Defendant for DUI. In a subsequent impound 
search of the Defendant's car an open bottle of what appeared to 
Officer Hurst to be vodka was found. The contents and the bottle 
were destroyed. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. THE DETENTION OF HEIDI ROCK WAS PROPER AND JUSTIFIED UNDER THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE STATE CONSTITUTION 
The procedure used by Officers Hurst and Isaakson was proper 
and was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution and under Article I §14 of the Utah State 
Constitution. 
The determination of when a detention becomes constitutionally 
invalid because of excessive length focuses not on the length of 
the detention alone, but on whether the police ditig^A^ly pursued 
means of investigation that was likely to confirm or~dispel their 
suspicions quickly, 7C}Bfi&ag^^ wafs^necessary tp detain 
the defendant. United States v. Sharpe. 4q^J3_^^J^P^\^^ S. Ct. 
1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985); State v. Grovier. 808 P.2d 133 (Utah 
App. 1991); State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880 (Utah App. 1990); State 
v. Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652 (Utah App. 1992). 
In Sharpe. the issue of an excessive detention was raised when 
a defendant was detained 20 minutes by a State Highway Patrolman 
who was waiting for the assistance of a DEA agent. The Court 
concluded that the 20 minute detention was not unlawful. 
Considering the traditional justification for a Terry stop, the 
Court noted that: 
the brevity of the invasion of the individual's Fourth 
Amendment interests is an important factor in determining 
whether the seizure is so minimally intrusive as to be 
justifiable on reasonable suspicion, ... we have 
emphasized the need to consider the law enforcement 
purposes to be served by the stop as well as the time 
reasonably needed to effectuate those purposes. 
Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 685, 84 L.Ed 2d at 615. The Court was also 
careful to note that: 
[t]he fact that the protection of the public might, in 
the abstract have been accomplished by "less intrusive" 
means does not, by itself, render the search 
unreasonable, [citations omitted]. The question is not 
simply whether some other alternative means was 
available, but whether the police acted unreasonably in 
failing to recognize or to pursue it. 
Sharpe at 687, 84 L.Ed.2d at 616. 
The situation in Sharpe is analogous to the case currently 
before the court. In Sharpe, a law enforcement officer detained an 
individual while waiting for another law enforcement officer who 
was better situated to conduct the investigation. The matter at 
hand in Sharpe was a narcotics investigation and the DEA agent was 
better able to conduct a full and proper investigation, although 
the State Highway Patrolman certainly had the authority and some 
experience in conducting narcotics investigations. 
Similarly, in this case, Officer Hurst had the skills and the 
ability to conduct the investigation, but Officer Isaakson was 
better situated to conduct the investigation. Department Policy 
required that Officer Hurst call for an on-duty Officer to handle 
the situation. Officer Isaakson responded to the scene within five 
to ten minutes, less than the time of the detention in Sharpe. 
Clearly, the detention in the case now before the court was no more 
intrusive than the delay in Sharpe, and was occasioned by an 
equally legitimate purpose. Although Officer Hurst certainly could 
have conducted the investigation himself, he did not act 
unreasonably in calling for an on-duty officer. 
Utah case law has also followed the rule set out in Sharpe. 
In State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133 (Utah App. 1991), the Court of 
Appeals of Utah upheld a 90 minute detention necessitated by a 
search of defendant's car. In Grovier, the Court noted 
specifically that the focus was not on the length of the detention, 
but on the means used by the officers to dispel their suspicions. 
Grovier at 136. 
The length of the detention in Grovier was apparently 
justified by the officer's concern for safety. Although the 
justification for the length of the detention was different from 
the justification presented by Officer Hurst in the present case, 
the reason are subject to the same reasonableness standard. 
Grovier distinctly noted that no major interruptions occurred 
during the search. Under the same reasonableness standard, it is 
difficult to imagine that ten to fifteen minutes is a major 
interruption that would invalidate a proper investigation. 
B. THE DESTRUCTION OF THE OPEN CONTAINER AND ITS CONTENTS DOES 
REQUIRE DISMISSAL OF THE CHARGE 
Defendant's challenge to the City's destruction of the open 
container and its contents is based on the Constitutions of the 
Untied States and the State of Utah and as such is governed by a 
reasonableness standard. 
The fact that the tangible evidence does not remain is a 
matter that would properly go to the weight of the evidence 
presented at the time of trial, not to its admissibility. Officer 
Hurst, as he testified at the time of the hearing on the issue, is 
able to provide proper foundation for what his testimony will be as 
to the contents of the container seized from the Defendant. 
Defendant also has the opportunity to present evidence to the 
contrary. The City acknowledges that it is a proper topic of 
examination of witnesses as to why the evidence was not retained. 
III. SUMMARY 
Under either the United States Constitution or the 
Constitution of the State of Utah, Officer Hurst's actions are 
reasonable and justified and the detention of the Defendant Heidi 
Rock was proper. 
Additionally the destruction of the open container does not 
rise to the level of a violation of Due Process and does not 
require suppression of evidence or dismissal of the charge. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For all the foregoing reasons the City respectfully requests 
that the Court deny the motion of Defendant. 
Dated this 29th day of March, 1992. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct 
copy of the above memorandum to defense counsel Mitch Zagar 3587 
West 4700 South Salt Lake City, Utah 84118 
this 29th day of March, 1993. 
Addendum Number 11 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress 
Evidence in a DUI Charge 
MITCHEL ZAGER - 3968 
Attorney for Defendant 
3587 West 4700 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118 
Telephone: 801-964-6100 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, | 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Plaintiff, | EVIDENCE IN D.U.I. CHARGE AND 
DISMISS OPEN CONTAINER CHARGE 
v. i 
HEIDI ROCK, i Case No. 925020755 TC 
Defendant. j Honorable Philip K. Palmer 
I. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. HEIDI ROCK was detained by Officer Hurst between 5 and 10 minutes during which 
time she was required to wait for Officer Isaacson to arrive at the scene and conduct field tests, 
which included some of the field tests previously conducted by Officer Hurst. 
2. Officer Hurst had the same skills, training and qualifications as Officer Isaacson 
concerning DUI investigations and conducting field tests. 
3. Officer Hurst had observed the diiving pattern and demeanor of Heidi Rock as she 
exited her vehicle. Officer Isaacson possessed no personal knowledge of those facts. 
4. Officer Hurst testified that the prolonged detention was necessitated by his off-duty 
status. 
II. 
THE PROLONGED DETENTION OF HEIDI ROCK BY OFFICER 
HURST VIOLATES BOTH THE UTAH AND UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTIONS AND WAS WITHOUT LEGITIMATE 
REASON AND THEREFORE UNREASONABLE 
Nowhere in case history has a Court held a detention permissible for the reason that an 
officer was off-duty. There are cases where Courts have held that a detention was permissible 
when legitimate reasons were shown. In United States vs. Sharpe. the Court found legitimate 
reasons to find the detention permissible where a patrolman detained a suspect until a DEA 
Agent with superior training and experience in dealing with narcotics investigations arrived at 
the scene. United States vs. Sharpe. 470 U.S. 675, 105, S.Ct. 1568, 1576 (1985). In Sharpe 
the patrolman who made the stop lacked the training and experience in dealing with narcotics 
and did not know all the facts involved in the case which were known to the DEA Agent from 
his previous observations. Id. at 1576. As further justification fc\ the detention in Sharpe the 
Court recognized that the delay in the investigation was created by the defendant's own evasive 
actions in avoiding the police. IdL In determining whether a detention is permissible, the 
United States Supreme Court in Sharpe stated that: 
. . . whether a detention is too long in duration to be justified as 
an investigative stop, we consider it appropriate to examine 
whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that 
was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during 
which time it was necessary to detain the defendant. IcL at 1575 
(emphasis added). 
The Sharpe Court pointed out that "the question is not simply whether some other 
alternative was available, but whether the police acted unreasonably in failing to recognize or 
to pursue it." IcL at 1576. 
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In this instance the detention is impermissible, since Officer Hurst has testified that he 
possessed training and experience in dealing with DUI arrests equivalent to that of Officer 
Isaacson. Furthermore, Officer Hurst was better situated that Officer Isaacson to conduct the 
DUI investigation, having personally observed the driving pattern of Heidi Rock and her 
demeanor as she exited her vehicle. It was Officer Hurst in this case who possessed all the facts 
involved in the case, not Officer Isaacson. The legitimate reasons supporting the permissible 
detention in Sharpe are not present in this case. 
Legitimate reasons for a prolonged detention were also found in State vs. Grovier where 
a vehicle search occurred during a 90-minute period without major interruption and where the 
delay was necessitated to ensure the officers' safety. State vs. Grovier. 808 P.2d. 133 (Utah 
App. 1991). In our case there was no reason nor necessity to seek an alternative investigation 
procedure. There was only one course of action that was reasonable and that was for Officer 
Hurst to complete his investigation without delay by conducting a sufficient number of field tests 
to determine Heidi Rock's sobriety. Incidently, a hand-off arrest could have been made to 
Officer Isaacson in the event Heidi Rock was eventually arrested, thereby satisfying Officer 
Hurst's concern regarding his off-duty status. 
The Court in Grovier states that: 
. . . the detention must be temporary and last no longer than is 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Grovier at 136 
(emphasis added). 
In this case the prolonged detention was not necessary to determine whether Heidi Rock 
was under the influence of alcohol. Officer Hurst had the skills to complete the investigation 
and make the determination without delay. The fact that Officer Hurst was off duty is not a 
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legitimate reason recognized by any Court to detain an individual's freedom. Officer Hurst's 
failure to complete his investigation without delay is unreasonable, unnecessary and 
impermissible. Absent a legitimate reason, Heidi Rock's fundamental rights as guaranteed by 
the Utah and United States Constitutions were violated and require suppression of evidence 
following the unlawful detention. 
III. 
THE DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE BY SALT LAKE CITY POLICE 
OFFICERS REQUIRE DISMISSAL OF THE OPEN CONTAINER CHARGE 
In this instance Salt Lake City Police Officers destroyed material, tangible evidence 
which they allege was an open container of alcohol. Heidi Rock is denied her due process 
under the United States and Utah Constitutions and is deprived of an opportunity to effectively 
cross-examine and confront the allegations against her due to the destruction of material evidence 
as described. Her opportunity to test and otherwise examine the alleged evidence is gone as a 
result of the Officers' actions. 
Admission of the officers' testimony that the label on the bottle said vodka is hearsay and 
also violates the Best Evidence Rule. For the reasons stated, the charge of Open Container 
requires dismissal. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
The unreasonable, unjustified and unnecessary detention of Heidi Rock violates her 
fundamental freedoms as guaranteed under the United States and Utah Constitutions as stated. 
The reason given that Officer Hurst was off-duty is not a legitimate reason, nor has it been 
recognized as such in any case cited as a justification to violating a person's fundamental rights. 
4 
This instance is plainly distinguishable from the legitimate reasons for extended detentions 
upheld in each of the cases cited before this Court. 
Furthermore, the destruction of material evidence requires dismissal of the Open 
Container Charge. 
Officer Hurst's arbitrary and unreasonable actions in detaining Heidi Rock without 
legitimate reason requires suppression of all the evidence obtained after the unlawful detention. 
Based upon the pleadings, testimony and oral argument, defendant moves this Honorable Court 
to grant this Motion for Suppression and Dismissal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^_ day of April, 1993. 
Mitchel Zager / J 
Attorney for Deftryfany 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing Motion To Suppress Evidence and 
Dismiss Open Container Charge was sent via U.S. mail, postage pre-paid, this 6th day of April, 
1993, to Salt Lake City Prosecutor, 451 South 200 East, Room 125, Salt Lake City, UT 84111. 
0] UwfCM, &>*UA~CJLJ 
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Addendum Number 12 
Third Judicial Court's Reaffirmation 
Decision of 4/16/93 
Cftrtr Circuit Court 
Judge Philip K. Palmer 
April 16, 1993 
Mr. Mitchell Zager 
Attorney at Law 
3587 West 4700 South 
Salt Lake City UT 84118 
RE: Salt Lake City vs. Heidi Rock 
Dear Mr. Zager: 
For your information, no copy of your responsive brief is in the court file, nor 
can my clerk locate one anywhere in the court system. Todd Godfrey, of the 
Salt Lake City Prosecutor's Office, provided me with a copy of the brief he 
received, at your request. 
I have carefully read your brief but regret to inform you that it does not 
change my original decision. Todd informs me you will be out of town 
approximately 30 days, but will be back prior to the May 19th date set for a jury 
trial on this matter. The court will hold this day open pending your return to 
Salt Lake City. 
Please notify the court if you do not intend to pursue a jury triaJ on the 
above date. 
Philip K. Palmer 
Jhird Circuit Court Judge 
PKP/ab 
451 South 200 East / Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 / 801-533-3971 
Addendum Number 13 
Transcript of Hearing on 6/17/93, 
pages 2, 3 and 4 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: This is your matter. 
MR. ZAGER: Yes, Judge. Heidi Rock. 
THE COURT: Oh, yes. Heidi Rock. That 
matter is on for review, I think. 
MR. ZAGER: Come on up, Heidi. 
THE COURT: This will be a plea, is that 
right, Mr. Zager? 
MR. ZAGER: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. ZAGER: There's a caveat on the pleading. 
We are considering an appeal in the case concerning the 
motion that we brought and in view of that I imagine the 
severity of the sentence may affect that decision. 
THE COURT: Okay. Your time hasn't run has 
it? Okay, what's the proposed plea? 
MR. GODFREY: Your Honor, we're moving to 
dismiss the infractions charged against Ms. Rock. I believe 
she's going to enter a change of plea on the DUI. It is our 
understanding that is a plea. I have some 
presentence recommendations for the court also. 
THE COURT: So you're moving to dismiss 
Counts Two and Three. 
MR. GODFREY: That's correct. 
THE COURT: Did you go over a plea form with 
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Ms. Rock, Mr. Zager. 
MR. ZAGER: I haven't, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Will you give him the plea form? 
THE CLERK: (unclear) I passed a couple out 
this morning already. 
MR. GODFREY: You handed them to me. 
THE CLERK: Did I hand it to you? 
MR. GODFREY: You handed it to me not to Mr. 
Zager. 
THE CLERK: I apologize, Your Honor, I can't 
tell these two guys apart. 
THE COURT: All right, Ms. Rock. 
Do you understand that by pleading guilty to the 
DUI you give up your right to a trial on the charge and you 
give up your right not to incriminate yourself because by 
pleading guilty you do admit that on July 19th of last year 
you drove your vehicle in Salt Lake City while you were 
under the influence of alcohol or had a blood alcohol 
content of .08 grams or greater. Do you understand that's 
the admission you are making. 
MS. ROCK: Yes. 
THE COURT: You also give up your right to 
appeal after trial, do you understand and wish to waive all 
those rights, Ms. Rock. 
MR. ZAGER: With the one caveat, Your Honor, 
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on the appellant issues that have been specifically reserved 
in this case. 
THE COURT: All right. You understand all 
the other information in that plea form that Mr. Zager has 
gone over with you? 
MS. ROCK: Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: Go ahead and sign it if you would 
both, please. 
Ms. Rock, what is your plea to the charge of 
driving while under the influence of alcohol? 
MS. ROCK: Guilty. 
THE COURT: The court will accept the plea. 
Do you waive time for sentencing, Mr. Zager? 
MR. ZAGER: We do, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: What was the City's 
recommendation? 
MR. GODFREY: Your Honor, it's a rare 
circumstance when I ever have the opportunity to speak on 
behalf of the defendant but I have spoken with Mr. Zager 
twice about Ms. Rock. This is a first offense. It is a 
situation where the breath test was in what I would call the 
medium range. I don't think there's an alcohol problem that 
underlies this offense. I'm convinced from my discussions 
with Mr. Zager that she's taken a lot of steps to see that 
this doesn't happen again. I don't think it's a situation 
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Addendum Number 14 
State v. Davis. 
821 P.2d, 9, 12 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 
STATE 
Cite as 821 P~2d 
CONCLUSION 
.We vacate the Commission's order deny-
ag*Adams benefits and direct the Commis-
ioh'to produce adequate findings of fact 
hd conclusions of law and enter a new 
rder. 
GREENWOOD and ORME, JJ., concur. 
( O | K £ Y N U M 8 E R S Y S T E M > 
5TATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Edwin Leslie DAVIS, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 910166-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Nov. 5, 1991. 
Defendant was convicted in the Fifth 
Jircuit Court, St. George Department, 
bines' L. Shumate, J., of driving under the 
Dfluence, interfering with peace officer, 
fusing to provide information, and driv-
Dgj^ vith' revoked license. Defendant ap-
^ d 7 i j T h e Court of Appeals, Bench, P.J., 
Jlf&J^t. officer had reasonable suspicion 
o^etain defendant. 
•^Affirmed. 
^grhninal Law <s=>1130(5) 
~ ^igviewing defendant's driving under 
pSfisence conviction, Court of Appeals 
(JiJiJiot consider defendant's challenge 
|grial court's finding that particular road 
""" Pe& to public where defendant did not 
J l ^ u e 1 in compliance with Rules of 
?jl!¥$~ Procedure. Rules App.Proc, 
||Wminai Law <s=>1158(4) 
^
c
° u r t ' s factual findings underly-
^Jsion^to grant or deny motion to 
qgateJfindings. 
v. DAVIS Utah 9 
9 (UtahApp. 1991) 
suppress will not be disturbed unless 
"clearly erroneous," that is, against clear 
weight of evidence or such that appellate 
court reaches definite and firm conviction 
that mistake has been made. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
3. Arrest <®=>63.5(1) 
Fourth Amendment protection against 
unreasonable searches and seizures applies 
to all detentions, including brief investiga-
tory stops by police that fall short of for-
mal arrest. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
4. Arrest <3=»68(4) 
No Fourth Amendment seizure occurs 
if nothing during encounter between police 
officer and citizen approximates detention. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
5. Arrest <s=>63.5(4) 
Where police officer approaches person 
and asks questions, person's refusal to talk 
to officer, without more, does not furnish 
reasonable grounds for further detention. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
6. Arrest <s=>68(4) 
Person is "seized" within meaning of 
Fourth Amendment when officer deprives 
person of liberty by means of physical 
force or show of authority. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. '4. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
7. Arrest <3=>63.5(4) 
There must be reasonable basis for 
even brief investigatory detention and offi-
cers must have reasonable suspicion, based 
on objective facts, that individual is in-
volved in criminal activity. U.S.C.A. Const. 
Amend. 4. 
8. Arrest <s=*68(4) 
Whether objective facts known to offi-
cer support reasonable suspicion of wrong-
doing to justify investigative detention is to 
be determined by totality of circumstances 
and in light of officer's experience and 
training. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
Her remaining claims are best left for another day. 
10 Utah ^ . ^ 
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9. Arrest «=€3^,j. 
Investigates S K * - - . _ . 
porary and last v ,,^- ^ ^ tem" 
to effect purpos, .> ^ ^ " ^ " a r 
Amend. 4. J - -~ - i 0 -OESt 
10. Arrest «=^^ s 
There was L' -^^_ 
Fourth Amends^ ^ T T ^ J * 3 0 5 » 
cer pulled his car - ^ V " " ^ ' ' I a i of5-
already parkec ^ ^ f o n t ' s 
Amend. 4. —*-*- Const 
11. Automobiles <==%&•> 
Officer had r ^ - ^ __ . 
crime had beer r . ^ J ^ - ^ 
justify detention ; c ' ^ ' S t S ^ C f i r r t *-° 
pulling his car ~ ^ " ^ * : e c zx> 
which was parb 
b e e r c a n o n t r u ^ ^ T - ^ ^ ^ 
and man standi^ v^LJ****? doo r ' 
i_ _ ~ _ _ - --««£ s r aa; srinat-
ing U.S.C.A.' 
U.C.A.1953, 41-6~44iS ~_--_?2 
for 
J- MacArthur W--~- -
defendant and ajr^L " " ^ 
Eric A. Ludlow a^ *-__ , _ 
St. George, for p ] ^ *T/~ ' ' t ^ * ? ' 
Before BENCH. C-2£E*T™n ., ORME, JJ. - « ^ O O D aid 
BENCH, Presiding J . ^ ^ 
Edwin Lesh'e Darc
 Vao „ 
driving under the -^-S. ~^T" ^ 
with a peace office- ^ T ^ * * 
information; and, d r ^ T ^ J ; r 0 v i d e 
license. Following fcs 3 n T % * ~ Y ° k e d 
sion motion by the -~i a ^^P1"68-
tered a conditional g ^ p ^ ? ? en" 
peal followed. We S r i ** 
I- FACTS 
On December 16. l%o ^ ,
 Jr 
officer of the Hurries Q £ - * £ ¥ "" ^ 
ment was parked in , t 2 - T ^ ^ 
its headlights off, to Z t ^ T " ** 
on a state road in W a ^ J ^ r ° f " c u " e 
the rear view mirror, %%£?£"*• ln 
car with its h e a d h g h t s - o n h i 3 1 ^ ^ 
1. On appeal, Davis chaBena* tr * J 
trial court that the road ^ H n d i n g ^ *« 
^
$
° P » to the public 
fore the car reached the officer, it turned 
down a side road leading to some nearby 
corrals, a small subdivision, and the private 
residence of the developer of the subdivi-
sion. The car traveled about 100 feet on 
the side road when its lights suddenly ex-
tinguished. 
The officer was concerned about the pos-
sibility of car problems and went to assist. 
As the officer pulled in behind the stopped 
car, he noticed a can of beer sitting on the 
trunk. The officer also noticed an opened 
passenger door, and a man standing near 
the trunk, urinating. The officer suspected 
an alcohol-related violation and activated 
the overhead lights on his vehicle. 
The officer then approached the car and 
found Davis seated behind the steering 
wheel. Although the keys were still in the 
ignition, the engine was off. The officer 
asked Davis where he had been and re-
quested Davis to produce a driver's license 
or some other form of identification. 
Davis said he was returning from closing 
"the Eagles" in Hurricane, but refused to 
produce any identification. During this 
verbal exchange, the officer smelled a 
strong odor of alcohol on Davis's breath. 
The man who had been urinating re-
turned to the car and handed the officer 
the vehicle registration through the driv-
er's open door. The officer repeated his 
request for Davis's license. This time, 
however, Davis cursed the officer, 
slammed the car door, and drove off with-
out producing any identification. The offi-
cer pursued Davis to a motor home near 
the developer's residence. Davis was sub-
sequently arrested for driving under the 
influence, interference with an arresting 
officer, refusal to provide information, and 
driving with a revoked license. 
[1] At the suppression hearing, Davis 
denied that he had driven on the state road, 
but claimed that he had driven along a 
parallel road, and stopped the car to move 
a rock. Since the place of the initial en-
counter was private, Davis argued that any 
police investigation was precluded.1 Davis 
Although Davis lists the issue as one presented 
STATE 
Cite as 821 VJA 
also argued that the arrest was invalid 
because it was not based on probable 
cause. 
The trial court held that the officer had a 
sufficiently articulable suspicion of wrong-
doing, on the basis of the facts as the 
officer perceived them, to permit investiga-
tion.. The court analyzed the encounter by 
noting that the officer was first alerted to 
a possible problem by seeing a vehicle turn 
off the State road and suddenly stop. The 
court then pointed out that, as the officer 
'arrived at the scene, he saw a can of beer 
"and a man urinating in close proximity to 
the car he had seen on the road only mo-
ments before. The trial court found that 
these facts, "by reason of simple biology," 
gave the officer an articulable suspicion 
'that an alcohol-related offense had been 
committed and, on that basis, that an inves-
tigation was proper. 
Following the denial of the suppression 
motion, Davis entered a conditional guilty 
plea and this appeal followed. See gener-
ally State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 939 (Utah 
App.1988) (regarding the use of conditional 
guilty pleas). 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
m [2] Search and seizure challenges are 
rfact* sensitive. State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 
rJi79,"880 (Utah 1989). The factual findings 
rofja trial court that underlie its decision to 
•^ grant or deny a motion to suppress will not 
sbe disturbed on appeal unless clearly erro-
neous. Smith, 781 P.2d at 881. Factual 
rfindings are clearly erroneous if they are 
* ,against the clear weight of evidence, or 
J_the appellate court otherwise reaches a def-
*u! cn(* ^rm conv^ction that a mistake has 
Vmade." State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 
[91,5193 (Utah 1987). 
III. ANALYSIS 
IP|vis_ argues that the police encounter 
;
 illegal because the officer did not have 
gffobable cause to detain, question, and ar-
ip | s fo r "driving under the influence and 
^ | f £ ^ e r offenses that arose out of the 
|fention and arrest." 
.T fal we do not consider it for failure to 
our briefing requirements under 
~ -*24(aj"of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
v. DAVIS Utah H 
9 (UtahApp. 1991) 
[3,4] At the outset, we reiterate the 
well-settled law since Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), 
that the Fourth Amendment protection 
against unreasonable searches and seizures 
applies to all detentions, including brief 
investigatory stops by police that fall short 
of formal arrest. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19, 88 
S.Ct. at 1879. See also State v. Sierra, 754 
P.2d 972, 975 (Utah App.1988); State v. 
Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah App.1987). 
Not every encounter between the police 
and the citizenry, however, implicates a 
Fourth Amendment violation; if nothing 
during an encounter approximates a deten-
tion, there is no Fourth Amendment sei-
zure. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 
U.S. 544, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 
497 (1980). 
[5] In Trujillo, 739 P.2d at 87-88, this 
court held that a person is not seized when 
a police officer merely approaches the per-
son on the street and asks questions, if the 
person stopped is willing to listen. The 
person approached is not required to listen 
to or answer an officer's questions, and 
refusal to talk to an officer, without more, 
"does not furnish reasonable grounds for 
further detention." Id. at 88. See also 
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498, 103 
S.Ct. 1319, 1324, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). 
[6-8] However, a person is "seized" 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment, when an officer deprives a person of 
his liberty by means of physical force or 
show of authority. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 
88 S.Ct. at 1879 n. 16; Trujillo, 739 P.2d at 
87. Since the Fourth Amendment protects 
against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, there must be a reasonable basis for 
even a brief investigatory detention and 
officers must have a "reasonable suspicion, 
based on objective facts, that the individual 
is involved in criminal activity." Brovm v. 
Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 2641, 
61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979). Whether the objec-
tive facts known to the officer support a 
reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing is to be 
determined by the totality of the circum-
stances and in light of the officer's experi-
ence and training. State v. Dorsey, 731 
See Christensen v. Munns, 812 P.2d 69, 72 (Utah 
App.1991); Koulis v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal, 
746 P.2d 1182, 1184-85 (Utah App.1987). 
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P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah 1986); State v. 
Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 541 (Utah App.1990); 
State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 508-09 
(Utah App.1989). 
[9] Moreover, an investigatory deten-
tion must be "temporary and last no longer 
than is necessary to effect the purpose of 
the stop." State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 
617 (Utah 1987) (citing United States v. 
Merritt, 736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir.1984), 
cert denied, 476 U.S. 1142, 106 S.Ct. 2250, 
90 L.Ed.2d 696 (1986)). 
[10] In this case, there was no deten-
tion subject to Fourth Amendment protec-
tion when the police officer initially pulled 
in behind the stopped car. Nothing m the 
record suggests that the officer caused 
Davis to stop the car or that formal investi-
gation into possible criminal wrongdoing 
had begun when the officer first arrived. 
The car in which Davis was seated had 
stopped before the officer arrived, indepen-
dent of any action taken by the officer, 
express or implied, under show of authority 
or physical force.2 Davis had not been 
detained by the officer, even momentarily, 
and could have reasonably believed that he 
was free to drive away as the officer pulled 
up in his vehicle. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 
554, 100 S.Ct. at 1877. 
[11] Hpwever, the moment the officer 
saw a can of beer on the trunk of the car, 
an open passenger door, and a man urinat-
ing, the officer had a reasonable suspicion, 
based upon objective facts, that a crime 
had been committed. The officer then de-
tained Davis by a display of authority when 
he activated the overhead lights on his 
vehicle. Although there may be a host of 
other innocent explanations to account for 
the presence of the persons and the things 
in and around the car, the officer had a 
reasonable basis to believe that the man 
urinating had been a passenger in the car, 
and that he had been drinking during the 
time he had been a passenger. 
The officer had a reasonable suspicion, 
based on objective facts, of a violation of 
the open container law, since it is illegal for 
2. Davis cites several cases for the proposition 
that a police officer must have reasonable suspi-
cion to detain for a traffic violation. See State 
a passenger to drink any alcoholic bever-
age in a motor vehicle, whether or not the 
vehicle is moving, stopped or parked on a 
highway. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-
44.20 (1990). In addition, the officer had a 
reasonable basis to suspect the driver of a 
related violation since it is illegal to allow 
another to keep, carry, possess or transport 
an open container of alcohol in the passen-
ger compartment of a motor vehicle when 
the vehicle is on the highway. Id. 
A peace officer has statutory authority 
to "stop any person in a public place when 
[the officer] has reasonable suspicion to 
believe [the person] has committed or is m 
the act of committing or is attempting to 
commit a public offense and may demand 
his name, address and an explanation of his 
actions." Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 
(1990). Therefore, the officer could proper-
ly approach Davis, and ask for proof of 
identification as part of his investigation. 
Based on objective facts learned in the 
course of his investigation, the officer had 
reasonable grounds to suspect Davis of 
drunk driving. The officer observed a can 
of beer on the car, smelled a strong odor of 
alcohol on Davis's breath, and found him to 
be uncooperative and argumentative. 
Davis's refusal to produce a driver's license 
also provided grounds to suspect Davis of a 
license-related violation. 
The factual findings of the trial court 
that the officer had probable cause were, 
therefore, not clearly erroneous. They 
were not against the clear weight of evi-
dence, and we are not convinced that a 
mistake was made. 
The judgment of the trial court is there-
fore affirmed. 
GREENWOOD and ORME, JJ., concur. 
Carpena, 714 P.2d 674 (Utah 1986). Since the 
police encounter in this case was not initiated 
by a traffic stop for a moving violation, Davis's 
Addendum Number 15 
State v. Grovier, 
808 P.2d. 133, 136 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 
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uously barred the present action against 
Davis. 
We look to contract law to answer appel-
lant's assertion. We first must determine 
whether the release provisions relating to 
appellant's claims against Davis are ambig-
uous. "Whether an ambiguity exists in a 
contract is a question of law which we 
review for correctness." Jarman v. Rea-
gan Outdoor Advertising, 794 P.2d 492, 
494 (Utah Ct.App.1990). Moreover, 
"[qjuestions of whether a contract is am-
biguous because of uncertain meaning of 
terms, missing terms, or facial deficiencies 
are questions of law that must be deter-
mined by the court before parol or extrinsic 
evidence may be admitted to clarify the 
contractual intent of the parties." Fitzger-
ald v. Corbett, 793 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah 
1990). See also Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a). 
"[T]he settled rule [for] interpreting a 
contract [is to] first look to the four cor-
ners of the agreement to determine the 
intentions of the parties. The use of ex-
trinsic evidence is permitted only if the 
document appears to incompletely express 
the parties' agreement or if it is ambiguous 
in expressing that agreement." Ron Case 
Roofing, 773 P.2d at 1385 (citations omit-
ted); see also John Call Eng'g v. Manti 
City Corp., 743 P.2d 1205, 1207 (Utah 
1987); Nixon and Nixon, Inc. v. John New 
& Assoc., 641 P.2d 144, 146 (Utah 1982). 
"Contract provisions are not rendered am-
biguous merely by the fact that the parties 
urge diverse interpretations." Jones v. 
Hinkle, 611 P.2d 733, 735 (Utah 1980). 
Appellant claims the meaning of the pas-
sage in the release which reserves her 
rights against Davis is ambiguous. Be-
cause of this alleged ambiguity, appellant 
urges this court to consider extrinsic evi-
dence (the parties' unexpressed intentions) 
and interpret this passage to mean that 
appellant merely agreed to pursue recovery 
directly from Davis and not from the re-
leased parties under the doctrine of respon-
deat superior. 
The trial court did not look to extrinsic 
evidence but concluded the unambiguous 
language of the release barred appellant's 
claim. We agree. If appellant intended to 
agree to pursue recovery directly from 
Davis and not from the released parties 
under the doctrine of respondeat superior, 
she easily could have stated that in the 
release. This court cannot rewrite the con-
tract because appellant failed to include 
language to protect her rights. As stated 
by Professor Corbin, "it certainly is not 
proper to reform the contract or to put in 
new provisions merely because one of the 
parties is disappointed in the . . . outcome." 
3 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 541 
(1972). The Utah Supreme Court has ech-
oed Professor Corbin's statement, noting 
that "[a] court will not . . . make a better 
contract for the parties than they have 
made for themselves," adding that u[a]n 
express agreement or covenant relating to 
a specific contract right excludes the possi-
bility of an implied covenant of a different 
or contradictory nature." Rio Algom 
Corp. v. Jimco, Ltd., 618 P.2d 497, 505 
(Utah 1980), at 505 (citation omitted). The 
release, by its clear and unambiguous lan-
guage, releases Davis from liability for his 
actions taken while he was an employee. 
CONCLUSION 
Davis' status as an employee was undis-
puted on summary judgment. Because 
Davis was an employee of the settling par-
ties, the release, in clear and unambiguous 
language, bars appellant's claims against 
him. We therefore affirm the trial court's 
summary judgment dismissing appellant's 
claims against Davis. 
GARFF and RUSSON, JJ., concur. 
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3. Arrest <S=>63.5(9) 
Determination of whether a detention 
of automobile, initially stopped for valid 
reasonable and articulable suspicion that 
crime had been committed, was constitu-
tionally invalid because excessive in length, 
focuses not on length of detention alone 
but on whether police diligently pursued 
means of investigation that was likely to 
confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
Defendant was convicted of possession 
of a controlled substance. Judgment was 
entered in the Fifth District Court, Iron 
County, J. Philip Eves, J. Defendant ap-
pealed. The Court of Appeals, Jackson, J., 
held that: (1) trial court's determination 
that initial stop of vehicle was made on 
reasonable and articulable suspicion that 
crime had been committed, based upon re-
port of confidential informant, was not 
clearly erroneous; (2) defendant had volun-
tarily consented to search of vehicle; and 
(3) officer's act of pushing aside heater 
hose, which revealed presence of drug, had 
not exceeded scope of consent which had 
prohibited dismantling of the vehicle. 
Affirmed. 
1. Arrest ®=»63.5(6) 
A reasonable and articulable suspicion, 
sufficient to support an initial stop of an 
automobile without a warrant or probable 
cause, may be premised upon an infor-
mant's tip so long as it is sufficiently reli-
able. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
2. Arrest ®=>63.5(6) 
Trial court determination that police 
had reasonable and articulable suspicion 
that crime was committed when stopping 
automobile was not clearly erroneous; con-
fidential informant known to officer, who 
had previously tipped him approximately 10 
to 15 times, had reported presence of meth-
amphetamine in a described automobile 
bearing specified license plate, and infor-
mant gave approximate area where vehicle 
was seen. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
4. Arrest 0=63.5(9) 
Duration of stop of vehicle, involving 
search for the presence of drugs, did not 
exceed the minimum intrusion necessary to 
dispel suspicion; automobile had promptly 
been taken to a sally port to continue the 
search, which was conducted without major 
interruptions and lasted no longer than 90 
minutes. 
5. Searches and Seizures <s=»194, 198 
In order for a consent to search of 
automobile to be constitutionally valid 
there must: (1) be clear and positive testi-
mony that consent was unequivocal and 
specific and freely and intelligently given; 
(2) government must prove consent was 
given without duress or coercion, express 
or implied; and (3) courts indulge every 
reasonable presumption against waiver of 
functional constitutional rights and there 
must be convincing evidence that such 
rights were waived. U.S.C.A. Const. 
Amend. 4. 
6. Searches and Seizures <®=3184 
Consent to drug search of automobile, 
made while detainee was not under re-
straint, was voluntary even though he was 
later handcuffed and placed in a holding 
area. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
7. Searches and Seizures <&=>186 
Statement made by detainee whose ve-
hicle was being searched for drugs, that he 
did not want his car dismantled, did not 
constitute revocation of his earlier consent 
to a search of his vehicle, including the 
trunk and motor compartment. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 4. 
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8. Searches and Seizures <s=>186 
Police officer's pushing aside of an 
automobile heater hose, in connection with 
a search of detained vehicle for the pres-
ence of drugs, did not exceed scope of 
detainee's consent to search, which had 
prohibited dismantling of vehicle; heater 
hose was undamped when search began 
and it became disconnected when officer 
pushed it aside to look up under dash. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
Loni F. DeLand (argued), McRae & De-
Land, Salt Lake City, for defendants and 
appellants. 
R. Paul Van Dam, State Atty. Gen., Ma-
rian Decker (argued), Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee. 
Before BENCH, JACKSON and 
RUSSON, JJ. 
OPINION 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Defendant appeals from an order deny-
ing his motion to suppress evidence. The 
defendant, David Vance Grovier, was 
charged with possession of a controlled 
substance (24.8 grams of methamphet-
amine) in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-8 (Supp.1990). Defendant chal-
lenges the order on three grounds: (1) the 
officer did not have reasonable suspicion to 
stop him, (2) defendant's consent to search 
his vehicle was not voluntary, and (3) the 
search of his vehicle exceeded the scope of 
his consent. We affirm. 
FACTS 
On February 23, 1990, at approximately 
10:30 a.m., Agent Lynn Davis of the Cedar 
City Police Department received a message 
to call one of his confidential informants. 
The informant gave the license plate num-
ber of a green 1973 Buick Riviera as either 
175BAT or 175BAP and told Davis that 
there was methamphetamine in the car. 
Officer Davis relayed this information to 
the Chief of Police, Peter J. Hansen, who 
then located the vehicle and had one of his 
officers, Sergeant Dennis Anderson, stop 
the green Riviera as it approached the Iron 
County Correctional Facility between 11:15 
and 11:30 a.m. Sergeant Anderson, not 
having been told by Hansen why the car 
should be stopped, told defendant that "a 
citizen had possibly seen him smoking mar-
ijuana," to which defendant replied, "I_ 
don't have anything, go ahead and search." 
Anderson then askedT"can wal'J and defen-
dant replied, "yes." Sergeant Anderson^ 
informed defendant that additional officers 
were on the way to help and^ defendant 
stated, "go ahead and search." 
Shortly after Anderson stopped defen-
dant, Hansen and Officer jKejyirLJlrton ar-
rivea\__prtoif searched defendant's passen-
ger, Petie Ray Hale, and removed a "fan-
nypack" which was searched by Hansen. 
Inside the fannypack, Hansen found a mar-
ijuana pipe and other drug paraphernalia. 
Subsequently, the trial court gran teiL 
Hale's motion to jsuppress this evjdejice on 
the grounds that it was obtained without a 
warrant and that no exception to a war-
rantless search existed. 
While Hale was being arrested, Hansen 
informed defendant that he intended to 
search the car for drugs. Defendant re-
plied, "go ahead and look." Hansen then 
asked him if his consent included the 
"trunk, passenger area, and motor com-
partment," to which defendant replied, 
"yes." Several officers searched the ve-
hicle for approximately twenty minutes 
during which time no controlled substances 
were found. 
Hansen approached defendant a second 
time, telling him that he believed that there 
were drugs in the car, and asked defendant 
if he intended to tell Hansen where to find 
them. Hansen further told defendant that 
he intended "to remove the car from the 
street into the sally port of the correctional 
facility and dismantle the car bolt by bolt if 
necessary." Defendant replied, "go for it." 
Defendant was then handcuffed, and he, 
Hale, and the vehicle were transported to 
the correctional facility which was approxi-
mately 200 yards from the initial stop. De-
fendant, while riding in the back of 
Anderson's patrol car on the way to the 
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correctional facility, stated that he did not 
want his car "torn apart." 
Once at the facility, defendant, who was 
not formally charged at the time, was 
placed in a holding area between the sally 
port and the booking area while the search 
proceeded. While there, defendant told 
Hansen he did not have permission to dis-
mantle the car. Hansen then instructed 
the officers conducting the search not to 
dismantle the car. Upon arriving at the 
correctional facility Gary Bulloch, a correc-
tions officer, searched defendant. While 
being searched, defendant stated that he 
did not want his car torn apart. 
After an unsuccessful cursory search, 
Hansen left the sally port to obtain a 
search warrant to dismantle the car. 
While Hansen was seeking to obtain a 
search warrant, Davis continued the 
search. When Davis pushed an undamped 
heater hose aside to reach up under the 
dash, the heater hose end fell away, reveal-
ing a cloth wrapped around a ziplock bag 
containing 24.8 grams of methamphet-
amine. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
We review findings of fact underlying a 
trial court's decision on a motion to sup-
press under the "clearly erroneous" stan-
dard. State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 882 
(Utah Ct.App. 1990); State v. Webb, 790 
P.2d 65, 82 (Utah Ct.App.1990); State v. 
Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 974 (Utah CtApp. 
1988). A trial court's findings of fact are 
clearly erroneous only if they are against 
the clear weight of the evidence. Mar-
shall, 791 P.2d at 882. 
THE INITIAL STOP 
Defendant claims that Sergeant 
Anderson did not have sufficient reason-
able suspicion to make the initial stop. 
This court has noted that there are three 
constitutionally permissible levels of police 
stops: 
(1) [A]n officer may approach a citizen at 
anytime and pose questions so long as 
the citizen is not detained against his 
will; (2) an officer may seize a person if 
the officer has an "articulable suspicion" 
that defendant has committed or is about 
to commit a crime; however, the deten-
tion must be temporary and last no long-
er than is necessary to effectuate the 
purpose of the stop; (3) an officer may 
arrest a suspect if the officer has proba-
ble cause to believe an offense has been 
committed. 
State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 763 (Utah 
1991) (quoting State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 
616, 617-618 (Utah 1987) (per curiam)). 
We have previously held that a level two 
stop requires a "reasonable articulable sus-
picion" that defendant has committed or is 
about to commit a crime. State v. Menke, 
787 P.2d 537, 541 (Utah Ct.App.1990); see 
also, Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (Supp. 
1990). Moreover, a reasonable articulable 
suspicion must be based on " 'objective 
facts' that the 'individual is involved in 
criminal activity.'" State v. Holmes, 774 
P.2d 506, 508 (Utah Ct.App. 1989) (quoting 
State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718, 719 (Utah 
1985)). "Whether there are objective facts 
to justify such a stop depends on the 'totali-
ty of the circumstances.'" Id. (quoting 
State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 
1987)). 
[1,2] A reasonable suspicion may be 
premised upon an informant's tip so long 
as it is sufficiently reliable. Alabama v. 
White, — U.S. , 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2414, 
110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990); Adams v. 
Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146-47, 92 S.Ct. 
1921, 1923-24, 32 L.Ed 2d 612 (1972); Unit-
ed States v. Thompson, 906 F.2d 1292, 
1295 (8th Cir.1990). In the case at bar, the 
trial court made the following findings: the 
informant was known to Officer Davis; he 
had previously tipped Davis approximately 
ten to fifteen times; he reported to Davis 
that he observed methamphetamine in an 
older green Buick Riviera driven by a man 
with a female passenger; he identified the 
license plate number as either 175BAT or 
175BAP; and he last observed the vehicle 
at the south end of Main Street in Cedar 
City. 
Based on those findings, the trial court 
concluded that the police officer's stop was 
"based upon articulable and substantial 
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facts that would lead a reasonable and 
prudent police officer to believe that a felo 
ny was presently being committed " 
After examining the totality of the circum 
stances, we conclude that the trial court's 
determination of reasonable suspicion was 
not clearly erroneous 
[3,4] Defendant further claims that 
even if the officer had a reasonable suspi 
cion that a crime had been committed, the 
officer's search exceeded the minimum in-
trusion necessary to dispel or confirm his 
reasonable suspicion In analyzing accept 
able lengths of detention, we have stated 
The United States Supreme Court has 
not chosen to define a bright line rule as 
to the acceptable length of a detention 
because "common sense and ordinary hu-
man experience must govern over rigid 
criteria " United States v Sharpe, 470 
U S 675, 685, 105 S Ct 1568, 1575, 84 
L Ed 2d 605 (1985) The Court has cho-
sen to focus, not on the length of the 
detention alone, but on "whether the po-
lice diligently pursued a means of investi 
gation that was likely to confirm or dis 
pel their suspicions quickly, during which 
time it was necessary to detain the defen 
dant" Id at 686, 105 S Ct at 1575 
State v Marshall, 791 P 2d 880, 884 (Utah 
CtAppl990) 
Defendant claims that the search, which 
lasted no longer than ninety minutes, ex-
ceeded the minimum intrusion necessary to 
dispel the officer's reasonable suspicions 
However, the length of defendant's deten-
tion is not the primary focus Rather, the 
focus is upon the means used by the offi-
cers to dispel their suspicions Id Chief 
Hansen testified that the reason he re 
moved the car to the sally port to continue 
the search was for safety reasons He 
further testified that no major interrup 
tions occurred during the entire search 
Accordingly, the trial court's factual find 
mg that the officers diligently pursued a 
means of investigation that was likely to 
confirm or dispel their suspicions was not 
clearly erroneous 
CONSENT 
[5] "A warrantless search conducted 
pursuant to a consent that is voluntary in 
fact does not violate the fourth amend-
ment " State v Webb, 790 P 2d 65 (Utah 
Ct App 1990) (quoting Schneckloth v Bus-
tamonte, 412 US 218, 219, 93 S Ct 2041, 
2043, 36 L Ed 2d 854 (1973)) Whether a 
consent to a search was voluntary is a 
question of fact to be determined from the 
totality of all the circumstances State v 
Marshall, 791 P 2d 880, 887 (Utah CtApp 
1990) (citing Schneckloth, 412 U S at 227, 
93 S Ct at 2047)), Webb, 790 P 2d at 82 
Further, the State has the burden of show-
ing that the consent was voluntarily given 
Webb, 790 P 2d at 82, Marshall, 791 P 2d 
at 887 This court has adopted the tenth 
circuit's analysis for determining whether 
the State has met its burden 
(1) There must be clear and positive tes-
timony that the consent was "unequivo-
cal and specific" and "freely and intelli-
gently given", (2) the government must 
prove consent was given without duress 
or coercion, express or implied, and (3) 
the courts indulge every reasonable pre-
sumption against the waiver of funda 
mental constitutional rights and there 
must be convincing evidence that such 
rights were waived 
Webb, 790 P 2d at 82 (quoting United 
States v Abbott, 546 F2d 883, 885 (10th 
Cir 1977)) (citations omitted) 
[6,7] When Chief Hansen asked defen 
dant for his consent to search the car he 
replied, "go ahead and look " When asked 
if his consent included a trunk and motor 
compartment search, defendant replied, 
"yes " When Hansen told defendant that 
he intended to remove the car to the correc-
tional facility and dismantle it bolt by bolt 
if necessary, defendant replied, "go for it " 
Defendant contends that his consent was 
not voluntary because he was either hand-
cuffed or in the holding area after the 
initial detention However, the facts do 
not support his claim When defendant 
initially consented to the search, he was 
neither handcuffed nor in the holding area 
His consent was unequivocal and unlimited 
regarding the scope of the search Later, 
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he told Chief Hansen that he did not want 
his car dismantled At that time, the hand-
cuffs had been removed and he had been 
placed in the holding area Finally, when 
defendant stated that the officers had bet-
ter not tear his car apart, he was not 
handcuffed or otherwise restrained 
Defendant's statements about disman-
tling and not tearing apart his car did not 
revoke his consent, they simply limited the 
scope of the search to which he had previ-
ously consented Defendant was detained 
while his car was searched, but the deten-
tion came after he had given his consent 
The later detention did not produce coer-
cion or duress which would preclude a find-
ing of voluntary consent at the outset 
Defendant was not informed of his right 
to refuse consent While failure to inform 
suspects of their right to refuse consent is 
not determinative, it is a factor to be evalu-
ated in assessing the voluntariness of a 
suspect's consent Schneckloth, 412 U S 
at 227, 93 S Ct at 2047 Therefore, the 
officer's failure to inform defendant of his 
right to refuse to consent, in and of itself, 
does not indicate that defendant involun-
tarily consented 
The trial court considered this court's 
requirements as set forth in Webb and de-
termined that defendant voluntarily con-
sented to the search of his car The trial 
court's finding on this issue was not clearly 
erroneous See State v Sterger, 808 P 2d 
122, 126-127, n 5 (Utah Ct App 1991)» 
be determined from the totality of the cir-
cumstances " US v Espinosa, 782 F2d 
888, 892 (10th Cir 1989) The trial court 
found that defendant limited the scope of 
the search by telling Chief Hansen not to 
"dismantle" his car, and by telling Officer 
Bulloch that he did not want his car torn 
apart Accordingly, Chief Hansen instruct-
ed his officers not to "dismantle" defen-
dant's car The trial court further found 
that Officer Davis "did not go beyond the 
scope permitted by the Defendant's con-
sent and did not damage the car, dismantle 
the car, tear the car apart, or do anything 
but merely push aside an unconnected heat-
er hose " 
The heater hose was undamped when 
the search began, and it became disconnect-
ed when Officer Davis pushed it aside to 
look up under the dash The hose's discon-
nection was not the result of stripping, 
taking apart, or tearing down actions which 
would indicate that Officer Davis attempt-
ed to dismantle defendant's car Further 
more, no other evidence was offered to 
show that Officer Davis or any of the offi 
cers exceeded the scope of defendant's con-
sent We see no error in the trial court's 
finding that Officer Davis's search did not 
exceed the scope of defendant's consent 
CONCLUSION 
We affirm the trial court's denial of de-
fendant's motion to suppress evidence 
THE SCOPE OF THE SEARCH 
[8] Defendant argues that Officer 
Davis's pushing aside of the heater hose 
exceeded the scope of the search to which 
he consented We disagree "The scope of 
a consent search is limited by the breadth 
of the actual consent itself" United 
States v Gay, 774 F 2d 368, 377 (10th 
Cir 1985), quoted in Marshall, 791 P 2d at 
888 "Whether the search remained within 
the boundaries of the consent is a fact to 
1. We decline to follow the analytical approach 
taken in State v Bobo, 803 P 2d 1268 (Utah 
Ct App 1990) which creates a two part analy 
sis—first a factual determination then a legal 
conclusion Rather we follow Utah and federal 
BENCH and RUSSON, JJ , concur 
| K£Y NUMBER SYSUM> 
case law which views the question of whether 
consent to a search was voluntary as a ques 
Hon of fact State v Sterger, 808 P 2d at 126-
127 n 5 (Utah Ct App 1991) 
Addendum Number 16 
State v. Marshall. 
791 P.2d. 880, 884 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
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HALL, C J , concurs in the concurring 
opinion of ZIMMERMAN, J 
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice, 
concurs in the result 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Gregory MARSHALL, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 890121-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah 
April 18, 1990 
Defendant appealed from order of the 
Seventh District Court, Sevier Countv, Don 
V Tibbs, J , which denied motion to sup 
press The Court of Appeals, Billings, J , 
held that (1) stop of defendant was not 
pretextual, (2) detention of defendant after 
the stop was not unreasonable, but (3) 
State could not raise issue of defendant's 
standing for the first time on appeal, but 
(4) remand was required for determination 
of specific issues with respect to search of 
suitcase found in trunk of automobile 
Reversed and remanded 
1 Criminal Law <s=>394 6(5) 
Trial court must state its findings on 
the record with respect to motion to sup 
press and those findings must be suffi 
ciently detailed in order to allow reviewing 
court the opportunity to adequately review 
the decision U C A 1953, 77-35-12(c) 
2 Arrest <s=>63 5(6) 
Protective shield of the Fourth Amend 
ment applies when an officer stops an auto 
mobile on the highway and detains its occu 
pants U S C A Const Amend 4 
3. Arrest <&=>63.5(4) 
Police officer may constitutionally stop 
a citizen based on specific, articulable facts 
which would lead a reasonable person to 
conclude that the citizen has committed or 
is about to commit a crime 
4 Automobiles <®=349(3) 
Police officer can stop an automobile 
for a traffic violation committed in the offi 
cer's presence 
5. Automobiles <s=»349 5(3) 
Officer may not use traffic violation 
stop as a pretext to search for evidence of 
a more serious crime 
6. Automobiles <s=>349(5), 349.5(3) 
Stop of defendant's vehicle because of 
malfunctioning turn signal was permissible 
and was not a pretext to search for evi 
dence of drug trafficking where the officer 
did not become suspicious of the defendant 
until after the stop 
7 Automobiles <3=*349(17, 18) 
Officer's investigatory detention of 
motorist and request for permission to 
search trunk was reasonable where motor 
ist stated that he was driving rental car on 
a skiing trip but the rental agreement 
called for the automobile to be returned to 
New York five days after being rented in 
California 
8 Criminal Law «=>1031(1) 
State cannot raise issue of standing to 
challenge search for the first time on ap-
peal 
9 Searches and Seizures <s=>192 
Defendant had the ultimate burden of 
proof to establish that his Fourth Amend 
ment rights were violated and that he had 
an expectation of privacy in the area 
searched or the article seized U S C A 
Const Amend 4 
10. Searches and Seizures <S=>23, 192 
Warrantless searches are per se unrea 
sonable, and burden is on the State, in first 
instance, to show that a warrantless search 
is lawful 
STATE v. MARSHALL 
Cite as 791 P-2d 880 (Utah App 1990) 
11. Criminal Law <S=»394.5(4) 
Prosecutor, as part of the State's bur-
den to establish constitutionality of a war-
rantless search, must give a defendant no-
tice that he will be put to his proof on the 
issue of Fourth Amendment standing, that 
can be done at any time during the hearing 
on defendant's motion to suppress as long 
as defendant has an opportunity to put on 
evidence to meet the claim U S C A 
Const Amend 4 
12. Criminal Law <S=539(2) 
Defendant's testimony at motion to 
suppress hearing cannot be used against 
him at trial 
13 Criminal Law <$=*! 181.5(7) 
Remand for rehearing on motion to 
suppress was required where trial court 
had not focused on the critical issue of the 
search of suitcases in trunk of automobile 
14 Searches and Seizures <s=»171 
Search is valid under the Fourth 
Amendment if it is conducted as a result of 
defendant's voluntary consent U S C A 
Const Amend 4 
15. Searches and Seizures <®=»186 
Even when a defendant voluntarily 
consents to a search, the ensuing search 
must be limited in scope to only the specific 
area agreed to by the defendant 
16. Searches and Seizures <s=>161 
Loss of standing to challenge a search 
cannot be brought about by illegal police 
conduct 
Jerold D McPhee and Knstme K Smith, 
Salt Lake City, for defendant and appel 
lant 
R Paul Van Dam and Christine F Soltis, 
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee 
Before DAVIDSON, 
JACKSON, JJ 
BILLINGS and 
•This opinion issued on Petition for Rehearing 
replaces the opinion of the same name issued 
Utah 881 
AMENDED OPINION * 
BILLINGS, Judge 
The appellant, Gregory J Marshall ("Mr 
Marshall"), was charged with possession of 
a controlled substance with the intent to 
distribute for value, a second degree felo-
ny, in violation of Utah Code Ann 
§ 58-37-8 (1989) Mr Marshall filed a pre-
trial motion to suppress the 140 pounds of 
marijuana seized from the rental car he 
was driving when he was arrested The 
trial court denied Mr Marshall's motion 
and he filed this interlocutory appeal We 
reverse and remand for further proceed-
ings consistent with this opinion 
We recite the facts surrounding the sei-
zure of the contraband in detail as the legal 
issues presented are fact sensitive State 
v Sierra, 754 P 2d 972, 973 (Utah Ct App 
1988) Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Den-
is Avery ("Trooper Avery") was driving on 
Interstate 70 near Sahna, Utah He no-
ticed Mr Marshall's vehicle in the left hand 
lane passing a motor home Trooper 
Avery observed that Mr Marshall's turn 
signal remained blinking for approximately f ^ 
two miles after he passed the motor home^ ^ j 
Not knowing whether Mr Marshall's signa\ ~T < 
was malfunctioning or whether Mr Mar-
shall had negligently left the signal on, 
Trooper Avery pulled the vehicle over to 
inform Mr Marshall of the problem and to 
give him a warning ticket Trooper Avery 
had issued similar warning citations for 
turn signal violations approximately five to 
ten times in the previous six month period 
Prior to stopping Mr Marshall, Trooper 
Avery noticed the vehicle had California 
license plates He approached Mr Mar 
shall s vehicle and informed Mr Marshall 
of the turn signal problem Mr Marshall 
responded that he had been having "a hard 
time keeping the thing turned off " 
Trooper Avery asked Mr Marshall for 
his driver's license and vehicle registration 
Mr Marshall produced a New York driver's 
license and a California rental agreement 
for the vehicle Mr Marshall said he was 
on December 26 1989 
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going skiing in Denver and planned to re-
turn the car to San Diego, California. 
However, the rental agreement indicated 
that the car would be returned in New 
York in five days. 
Trooper Avery acknowledged he became 
suspicious that Mr. Marshall might be 
transporting drugs. Trooper Avery asked 
Mr. Marshall to return with him to his 
patrol car where he issued a warning cita-
tion for "Lights, head, tail, other." Troop-
er Avery then returned Mr. Marshall's driv-
er's license and the rental agreement. 
Trooper Avery next asked Mr. Marshall 
if he was carrying alcohol, drugs or fire-
arms. Mr. Marshall stated he was not. 
Trooper Avery then asked Mr. Marshall if 
he could "look inside the vehicle." Mr. 
Marshall responded, "Go ahead." Trooper 
Avery and Mr. Marshall walked back to 
Mr. Marshall's vehicle. The passenger 
door was locked and Mr. Marshall reached 
in on the driver's side to open the door. 
Trooper Avery noticed a small red bag on 
the floor of the vehicle and asked if he 
could open it. Mr. Marshall agreed. No 
contraband was found inside the bag or the 
passenger compartment of the vehicle. 
Trooper Avery then asked if Mr. Mar-
shall had a key to the trunk and if Mr. 
Marshall would open the trunk. Mr. Mar-
shall attempted to open the trunk, but was 
shaking so badly that Trooper Avery had to 
assist him by holding the key latch cover 
up while Mr. Marshall inserted the key. 
Trooper Avery saw four padlocked suitcas-
es when Mr. Marshall opened the trunk. 
Trooper Avery asked Mr. Marshall what 
the suitcases contained and Mr. Marshall 
responded "clothes." Trooper Avery then 
asked if he could look in the suitcases. Mr. 
1. Utah appellate courts have consistently re-
quired detailed findings of fact to support a 
judgment entered by a trial judge in civil cases. 
Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 
1979) ("The importance of complete, accurate 
and consistent findings of fact in a case tried by 
a judge is essential to the resolution of dispute 
under the proper rule of law. To that end the 
findings should be sufficiently detailed and in-
clude enough subsidiary facts to disclose the 
steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each 
factual issue was reached."); Sampson v. Ri-
chins, 770 P.2d 998, 1002-03 (Utah Ct.App.1989) 
(findings of fact must indicate the "mind of the 
Marshall immediately reversed his state-
ment and responded that the suitcases 
were not his and must have already been in 
the trunk when he rented the vehicle. 
Trooper Avery testified there was some 
play in the zipper of one bag and he un-
zipped it far enough to see a green leafy 
substance. Trooper Avery then arrested 
Mr. Marshall for possession of a controlled 
substance. 
Mr. Marshall did not testify or present 
any evidence to contradict Trooper Avery's 
testimony during the hearing below. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"[W]e will not disturb the trial court's 
factual evaluation underlying its decision to 
grant or deny a motion to suppress unless 
it is clearly erroneous." State v. Sierra, 
754 P.2d 972, 974 (Utah Ct.App.1988). See 
also State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 
(Utah 1987); State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 
326, 327 (Utah Ct.App.1989). Further, 
"[t]he trial court's finding is clearly errone-
ous only if it is against the clear weight of 
the evidence or if [the appellate court] 
reachfes] a definite and firm conviction that 
a mistake has been made." State v. Sery, 
758 P.2d 935, 942 (Utah Ct.App.1988). 
[1] Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 
12(c) requires the trial court to state its 
findings on the record "[wjhere factual is-
sues are involved in determining a motion." 
Those findings must be sufficiently de-
tailed in order to allow us the opportunity 
to adequately review the decision below.1 
PRETEXT STOP 
Initially, Mr. Marshall contends Trooper 
Avery used the fact that his turn signal 
court." (quoting Parks v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 
673 P.2d 590, 601 (Utah 1983)). 
Detailed findings of fact likewise greatly ease 
the burden of an appellate court in its review of 
a trial court's decision on a motion to suppress. 
This is particularly true where multiple issues 
"are presented in the motion to suppress. 4 W. 
LaFave, Search & Seizure § 11.2, at 252 (1987) 
[hereinafter "LaFave"} (citing State v. Johnson, 
16 Or.App. 560, 519 P.2d 1053. 1058-59 (1974)). 
Many jurisdictions require specific findings of 
fact on all motions to suppress. See LaFave at 
§ 11.2 n. 188. We believe the requirement a 
sound one. 
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was malfunctioning as a pretext to stop his 
vehicle to search for evidence of drug traf-
ficking. 
[2-5] The protective shield of the 
fourth amendment applies when an officer 
stops an automobile on the highway and 
detains its occupants. State v. Sierra, 754 
P.2d 972, 975 (Utah Ct.App. 1988). A police 
officer may constitutionally stop a citizen 
on two alternative grounds. First, the stop 
"could be based on specific, articulable 
facts which, together with rational infer-
ences drawn from those facts, would lead a 
reasonable person to conclude [defendant] 
had committed or was about to commit a 
crime." Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
1. 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 
(1968); State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408, 
412 (Utah 1984); State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 
85, 88 (Utah Ct.App. 1987)). Second, the 
police officer can "stop an automobile for a 
traffic violation committed in the officer's 
presence." Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977. How-
ever, an officer may not use a traffic viola-
tion stop as a pretext to search for evi-
dence of a more serious crime. Id. 
To determine if Trooper Avery stopped 
Mr. Marshall's vehicle to investigate his 
hunch that Mr. Marshall's vehicle was in-
volved in drug trafficking, we determine 
whether a hypothetical reasonable officer, 
in view of the totality of the circumstances 
confronting him or her, would have stopped 
Mr. Marshall to issue a warning for failing 
to terminate a turn signal. Id. a t 978. 
2. While the warning citation does not specify 
which provision of the Utah Code Mr. Marshall 
violated, the state asserts that his conduct was 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-117(1) 
(1988) which, with our emphasis, provides: 
It is a misdemeanor for any person to drive 
or move or for the owner to cause or know-
ingly permit to be driven or moved on any 
highway any vehicle or combination of ve-
hicles which is in such unsafe condition as to 
endanger any person, or which does not con-
tain those parts or is not at all times equipped 
with lamps and other equipment in proper 
condition and adjustment... . 
3. In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 660-61, 99 
S.Ct. 1391, 1399-1400, 59 L.Rd.2d 660 (1979), 
the United States Supreme Court stated that an 
officer has a duty in the interest of highway 
safety to stop vehicles for safety reasons. 
"Many violations of minimum vehicle-safety re-
quirements are observable, and something can 
[6] Mr. Marshall claims Trooper 
Avery's stop of his vehicle is similar to the 
stop we found unconstitutional in Sierra. 
We disagree. In Sierra, the basis articu-
lated for the stop was that the driver re-
mained in the left lane too long after pass-
ing a car. In this case, Trooper Avery 
perceived an equipment problem with Mr. 
Marshall's „caj*^E[ther_hi^ta^ 
malfunctioning or he had negligently failed 
to turn it off.2 Courts consistently have 
held that a police officer can stop a vehicle""" 
when he or she believes the vehicle's safety 
equipment is not functioning properly.3 
Furthermore, unlike the officer in Sier-
ra, Trooper Avery was not suspicious of 
Mr. Marshall for other reasons before the 
stop, had not followed him in order to find 
some reason to pull him over, and, before 
the alleged violation occurred, had not radi-
oed for help thereby indicating he intended 
to stop the vehicle. 
In conclusion, we find Trooper Avery's 
stop of Mr. Marshall's vehicle was not a 
pretext, but wasjt yajid exercise of police 
authority to make certain Mr. Marshall's 
vehicle was functioning properly. 
UNREASONABLE DETENTION 
[7] Next, Mr. Marshall complains that 
the extent of his detention and the scope of 
Trooper Avery's investigation exceeded 
constitutional limits.4 
be done about them by the observing officer, 
directly and immediately." Id. at 660, 99 S.Ct. 
at 1399. The Court inferred that as long as an 
officer suspects the driver is violating "any one 
of the multitude of applicable traffic and equip-
ment regulations," the police officer may legally 
stop the vehicle. Id. at 661, 99 S.Ct. at 1400. 
See Townsel v. State, 763 P.2d 1353, 1355 (Alas-
ka Ct.App.1988) (court held stop justified when 
vehicle's headlight was out, a tail light was bro-
ken, the license plate and windows were ob-
scured, and speeding); State v. Puig, 112 Ariz. 
519, 544 P.2d 201, 202 (1975) (suspicion of de-
fective turn signals justified stop); State v. Full-
er, 556 A.2d 224, 224 (Me. 1989) (stop justified 
when blinking headlights led officer to stop 
vehicle for safety reasons). 
4. We do not analyze this issue under article I, 
section 14 of the Utah Constitution as the state 
constitutional issue was not sufficiently particu-
larized below nor is a reasoned analysis provid-
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"[I]n determining whether the seizure 
and search were 'unreasonable' our inquiry 
is a dual one—whether the officer's* action 
was justified at its inception, and whether 
it was reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances which justified the interfer-
ence in the first place." Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 
L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). 
We have previously found that Trooper 
Avery's traffic stop of Mr. Marshall was 
justified. The remaining question is 
whether Trooper Avery's subsequent dej-
tention and questioning of Mr. Marshall 
was reasojmbfy related to the initial traffic 
stop or was _ju_stified ^because Trooper 
Avery had a reasfinahle^siispicioa to believe 
Mr. Marshall was_engaged in a more seri-
ous crime. United States v. Guzman, 864 
F.2d 1512, 1519 (10th Cir.1988). 
The United States Supreme Court has 
not chosen to define a bright-line rule as to 
the acceptable length of a detention be-
cause "common sense and ordinary human 
experience must govern over rigid crite-
ria." United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 
675, 685, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1575, 84 L.Ed.2d 
605 (1985). The Court has chosen to focus, 
not on the lengtji of the detention alone, 
but on "whether the police diligently pur-
sued a means of investigation that was 
likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions 
quickly, during which time it was neces-
sary to detain the defendant." Id. at 686, 
105 S.Ct. at 1575. 
Trooper Avery wrote out the warning 
citation within ten minutes of stopping Mr. 
Marshall and then returned Mr. Marshall's 
driver's license and the vehicle rental 
agreement. Trooper Avery claims that as 
a result of his examination of Mr. Mar-
shall's driver's license and the vehicle rent-
al agreement and his brief conversation 
with Mr. Marshall, he became suspicious 
that Mr. Marshall was involved in drug 
trafficking. Specifically, Trooper Avery 
points to the fact that Mr. Marshall produc-
ed a New York driver's license and a Cali-
fornia rental agreement for the vehicle. 
When questioned about the rental agree-
ment, Mr. Marshall said he was going ski-
ing in Colorado and planned to return the 
car to San Diego, California. However, the 
rental agreement, jndicated the car was to 
be returned to New York in five days, the 
approximate time itTakes to drive directly 
from California to New York. In addition, 
Mr. Marshall was driving along a well-
known drug trafficking route. 
As a result of his suspicion, Trooper 
Avery then asked Mr. Marshall if he was 
carrying weapons, alcohol, or drugs in the 
vehicle. Mr. Marshall responded he was 
not. Then Trooper Avery allegedly asked 
for permission to look into the vehicle and 
received Mr. Marshall's consent. 
The trial judge found that Trooper 
Avery's "investigation was reasonable in 
view of.t)ieieiendant'^^J^tem^nJs_jn_£e-
gards to the vehicle ownership and the 
driver's^ usage. The destination itinerary 
would have put a reasonable officer on 
notice that something was wrong." Al-
though not directly so stating, the judge, in 
substance, concluded that Trooper Avery 
had reasonable suspicion to believe that 
Mr. Marshall was involved in illegal con-
duct. Although it is a close call, we agree 
with the trial court's assessment of the 
reasonableness of the detention. 
We find that Trooper Avery's question-
ing of Mr. Marshall as to conduct unrelated 
to the traffic stop was justified because he 
had reasonable suspicion to believe Mr. 
Marshall was engaged in a more serious 
crime. See Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1519. 
In conclusion, based on the totality of the 
circumstances, we agree - with the "trial 
court that Trooper A verves ten-minute de-
tention and brief questioning of Mr. Mar-
shall prior to Mr." Marshall's alleged con-
sent to search the vehicle was not an un-
reasonable detention. 
SEARCH 
On appeal, Mr. Marshall argues that 
even if his initial stop and subsequent de-
tention were not constitutionally deficient, 
the subsequent search of the trunk of the 
ed on appeal as to why our analysis should be Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327-28 (Utah Ct.App. 
different under Utah's* constitution. See State v. 1989). 
STATE v. 
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vehicle and the suitcases found in the trunk 
without a warrant violated his fourth 
amendment rights. The state contends, on 
the other hand, that Mr. Marshall consent-
ed to the search of the trunk and aban-
doned any privacy interest in the suitcases 
and thus Trooper Avery's search of the 
suitcases was constitutionally permissible.5 
In our prior opinion, we focused solely on 
whether the search of the suitcases was 
proper. We found the warrantless search 
of the suitcases unconstitutional as we re-
fused to allow the state to raise the issue 
of fourth amendment standing for the first 
time on appeal. We granted the state's 
petition for rehearing to re-examine the 
related fourth amendment issues of volun-
tary consent and abandonment which are 
central to a resolution of this appeal. 
1. Standing 
The state, in its original brief on appeal, 
claimed Mr. Marshall was without standing 
to challenge the seizure of the suitcases as 
he had disclaimed any ownership or posses-
sory interest in the suitcases during the 
search and thus had no expectation of pri-
vacy in their contents. See Rakas v. Illi-
nois, 439 U.S. 128, 138-50, 99 S.Ct. 421, 
427-34, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978); State v. 
Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334, 1335 (Utah 1984); 
State v. Grueber, 776 P.2d 70, 73-75 (Utah 
Ct.App.1989); State v. DeAlo, 748 P.2d 
194, 196-97 (Utah Ct.App.1987). The state 
relies upon the following testimony from 
the preliminary hearing: 
5. The state does not argue that Trooper Avery 
had probable cause to search either the car or 
the suitcases. We, therefore, need not deal with 
the troublesome issue of whether probable 
cause to search an automobile is sufficient un-
der the automobile exception to search a locked 
suitcase found in the trunk of a car. See, e.g., 
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct. 
2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982) (if probable cause 
exists, police can search closed containers found 
in vehicle); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 
99 S.Ct. 2586, 61 L.Ed.2d 235 (1979) (warrant-
less search of a suitcase found in the trunk of a 
taxi invalid), United States v. Chadwick, 433 
U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2476. 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) 
(warrantless search of a footlocker found in the 
trunk of a vehicle invalid); State v. Hygh, 711 
P.2d 264, 272 n. 1 (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman. J., 
concurring separately) (criticizing the Ross 
holding). 
MARSHALL Utah 8 8 5 
«0 (Utah App. 1990) 
Q. [Defense Counsel] And what was in-
side the trunk? 
A. [Trooper Avery] There were four 
suitcases. 
Q. Did you ask if you could look in 
those suitcases? 
A. Uh huh (affirmative). First of all, I 
asked him what was in the suitcases, 
and he told me, right quickly, clothes. 
Then when I looked at him again, he 
told me that he didn't know where they 
came from, they must have been in 
there when he rented the car. 
In our prior opinion, we relied on the 
Utah Supreme Court decision of State v. 
Schlosser, 114 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989), 
which squarely held that standing to chal-
lenge the validity of a search under the 
fourth amendment "is not a jurisdictional 
doctrine [but] is a substantive doctrine that 
identifies those who may assert rights 
against unlawful searches and seizures." 
Id. at 1138. Citing the general rule that a 
substantive issue or "claim of error cannot 
be raised for the first time on appeal," the 
supreme court deemed the issue of stand-
ing waived. Id. at 1138-39. 
The state attempts to distinguish Schlos-
ser, claiming that in that case the state not 
only failed to raise the issue of standing in 
the motion to suppress hearing, but also on 
appeal and that here, unlike Schlosser, the 
state raises standing simply as an alterna-
tive ground to uphold the trial court's deni-
al of the motion to suppress.6 We do not 
6. Prior to Schlosser, the Utah Supreme Court 
had, in several cases, considered standing for 
the first time on appeal and had utilized the 
doctrine to refuse to consider the constitutional 
validity of a challenged search. See, e.g., State 
v. Constantino, 732 P.2d 125, 126-27 (Utah 1987) 
(per curiam) (court did not address whether the 
issue of standing had been raised below, but 
stated that defendant could not assert any ex-
pectation of privacy in vehicle because he did 
not own vehicle and had presented no testimo-
ny that he had permission of owner or had 
boi rowed vehicle "under circumstances that 
would imply permissive use"). State v. lacono, 
725 P.2d 1375, 1377-78 (Utah 1986) (State below 
argued there was consent by defendant's ex-wife 
to search his mother's trailer. On appeal, the 
state argued defendant had no possessory or 
proprietary interest in the trailer and thus had 
no expectation of privacy. The court declined 
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find the distinction determinative.7 
The United States Supreme Court took 
the same position in Steagald v. United 
States, 451 U.S. 204, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 68 
L.Ed.2d 38 (1981), when it refused to allow 
the government to raise the issue of fourth 
amendment standing for the first time on 
appeal to provide an alternative ground to 
sustain the trial court's refusal to grant a 
motion to suppress. The Court concluded: 
Aside from arguing that a search war-
rant was not constitutionally required, 
the Government was initially entitled to 
defend against petitioner's charge of an 
unlawful search by asserting that peti-
tioner lacked a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the searched home, or that he 
consented to the search, or that exigent 
circumstances justified the entry. The 
Government, however, may lose its 
right to raise factual issues of this sort 
before this Court when it has made con-
trary assertions in the courts below, 
when it has acquiesced in contrary find-
ings by those courts, or when it has 
failed to raise such questions in a time-
ly fashion during the litigation. 
Id. at 209, 101 S.Ct. at 1646 (emphasis 
added). 
[8] The state, on petition for rehearing, 
contends that language in Rakas v. Illi-
nois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 
387 (1978), is contrary to our conclusion 
that the state should not be allowed to 
to reach the issue of consent because it found 
that defendant lacked standing to object to the 
search because the stipulated evidence did not 
show that defendant shared ownership, use or 
possession of the trailer.); State v. Valdez, 689 
P.2d 1334, 1335 (Utah 1984) (At trial, the defen-
dant produced evidence that neither the attache 
case in which the evidence was found nor the 
vehicle belonged to the defendant. The court 
did not address whether the issue of standing 
was raised below, but declined to reach the 
question of the validity of the search because 
the defendant conceded he did not own the case 
or the vehicle and had failed to show any expec-
tation of privacy.). In these earlier cases, it is 
sometimes unclear whether the Utah Supreme 
Court raised the issue of standing sua sponte on 
appeal or permitted the state to raise the issue 
of standing for the first time on appeal. We 
assume that Schlosser supercedes these earlier 
cases and thus do not follow them. 
7. Although the Utah Supreme Court refused to 
allow standing to be utilized to attack the trial 
raise standing for the first time on appeal. 
We disagree. The language in Rakas re-
lied upon by the state is consistent with our 
view. 
The proponent of a motion to suppress 
has the burden of establishing that his 
own Fourth Amendment rights were vio-
lated by the challenged search or seizure. 
The prosecutor argued that petitioners 
lacked standing to challenge the search 
because they did not own the rifle, the 
shells or the automobile. Petitioners 
did not contest the factual predicates of 
the prosecutors argument and instead, 
simply stated that they were not re-
quired to prove ownership to object to 
the search. The prosecutor's argument 
gave petitioners notice that they were 
to be put to their proof on any issue as 
to which they had the burden, and be-
cause of their failure to assert owner-
ship, we must assume, for purposes of 
our review, that petitioners do not own 
the rifle or the shells. 
Id. at 130 n. 1, 99 S.Ct. at 424 n. 1 (citations 
omitted) (emphasis added). 
[9,10] We agree with the state and Ra-
kas that Mr. Marshall has the ultimate 
burden of proof to establish that his fourth 
amendment rights were violated or, to put 
it otherwise, that he had an expectation of 
privacy in the area searched or the articles 
seized.8 Nevertheless, warrantless 
court's granting of a motion to suppress in 
Schlosser, the court relied on State v. Goodman, 
42 Wash.App. 331, 711 P.2d 1057 (1985). which 
held the state could not raise the issue of stand-
ing for the first time on appeal to provide an 
alternative ground for sustaining the trial 
court's denial of a motion to suppress. Id. 711 
P.2d at 1060. 
8. However, the failure of the state to challenge 
Mr. Marshall's standing at the suppression hear-
ing did not give Mr. Marshall an opportunity to 
assert his expectation of privacy. See Combs v. 
United States, 408 U.S. 224, 227-28, 92 S.Ct. 
2284. 2286. 33 L.Ed.2d 308 (1972) (per curiam) 
(Where petitioner's failure to assert an expecta-
tion of privacy may have been explained by the 
Government's failure to challenge standing ei-
ther at the suppression hearing or at trial, the 
United States Supreme Court remanded to the 
district court for further proceedings to allow 
petitioner to establish a privacy interest.). 
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searches are per se unreasonable and the 
burden is on the state, in the first instance, 
to show that a warrantless search is law-
ful. State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408, 
411 (Utah 1984). 
[11,12] We believe Rakas is consistent 
with our view that the prosecutor, as part 
of the state's burden to establish the con-
stitutionality of a warrantless search, must 
give a defendant "notice that he will be put 
to his proof on the issue of fourth amend-
ment standing. This can be done at any 
time during the hearing on a defendant's 
motion to suppress as long as the defen-
dant has an opportunity to put on evidence 
to meet the claim.9 Once the defendant 
has been put on notice that the state claims 
the warrantless search was constitutional 
because he has no expectation of privacy in 
the area searched, then the defendant must 
factually demonstrate that he does have 
standing to contest the warrantless search. 
We believe the Schlosser standing rule was 
fashioned to protect the defendant from 
being required to deal with new legal is-
sues on appeal when he had no warning of 
the necessity to develop the relevant facts 
below. 
2. Consent/Abandonment 
The state, on petition for rehearing, ex-
cuses its failure to raise the issue of stand-
ing claiming that neither Mr. Marshall, the 
state nor the trial judge focused on the 
search of the suitcases in the motion to 
suppress hearing. Rather, the state claims 
the hearing centered on the pretextual na-
ture of the stop, the unreasonable deten-
tion of Mr. Marshall and the unlawful 
search of the trunk. 
Mr. Marshall, on petition for rehearing, 
claims the following comment made by de-
fense counsel sufficiently focused the pro-
ceeding on the search of the suitcases: 
9. The defendant's testimony at the motion to 
suppress hearing cannot be used against the 
defendant at trial. See Simmons v. United 
States, 390 U.S. 377, 394, 88 S.Ct. 967, 976, 19 
L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968) (prosecutor cannot use a 
defendant's testimony at a suppression hearing 
as substantive evidence of guilt at trial unless 
defendant makes no objection). We note, how-
"Additionally there is no evidence that 
there was consent to search the bags." 
[13] Upon a re-examination of the 
record, we agree with the state that the 
parties and the trial judge did not focus on 
the critical issue of the search of the suit-
cases at the motion to suppress hearing. 
The result is that the trial judge did not 
make adequate findings of fact on the is-
sues of voluntary consent to search the 
trunk or the suitcases and Mr. Marshall's 
alleged abandonment of any privacy inter-
est in the suitcases, which the parties now 
agree are pivotal on appeal. We therefore 
remand for a rehearing on these critical 
issues. We nevertheless discuss the con-
trolling law to guide the trial court on 
rehearing. 
[14] A search is valid under the fourth 
amendment if it is conducted as a result of 
the defendant's voluntary consent. 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 
219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2043, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 
(1973); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 980 
(Utah Ct.App.1988). "[T]he question [of] 
whether a consent to a search was in fact 
'voluntary' or was the product of duress or 
coercion, express or implied, is a question 
of fact to be determined from the totality 
of all the circumstances." Schneckloth, 
412 U.S. at 227, 93 S.Ct. at 2047-48. "A 
trial court's finding of voluntary consent 
will not be reversed unless it is clearly 
erroneous." United States v. Miller, 589 
F.2d 1117, 1130 (1st Cir.1978), cert, denied, 
440 U.S. 958, 99 S.Ct. 1499, 59 L.Ed.2d 771 
(1979). 
In United States v. Abbott, 546 F.2d 883 
(10th Cir.1977), the Tenth Circuit outlined 
the specifics necessary for the government 
to sustain its burden to show that volun-
tary consent was given: 
(1) There must be clear and positive testi-
mony that the consent was "unequivocal 
and specific" and "freely and intelligent-
ever, that the United States Supreme Court had 
not decided whether the Simmons rule pre-
cludes the use of a defendant's suppression 
hearing testimony to impeach the defendant's 
testimony at trial. See United States v. Salvucci, 
448 U.S. 83. 94 & n. 9, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 2554 & n. 
9, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980). 
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ly given"; (2) the government must 
prove consent was given without duress 
or coercion, express or implied; and (3) 
the courts indulge every reasonable pre-
sumption against the waiver of funda-
mental constitutional rights and there 
must be convincing evidence that such 
rights were waived. 
Id. at 885 (quoting Villano v. United 
States, 310 F.2d 680, 684 (10th Cir.1962)). 
See also United States v. Recalde, 761 
F.2d 1448, 1453 (10th Cir.1985). See gener-
ally State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 
106 (Utah 1980); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 
972, 980-81 (Utah Ct.App.1988). 
[15] Even when a defendant voluntarily 
consents to a search, the ensuing search 
must be limited in scope to only the specific 
area agreed to by defendant. "The scope 
of a consent search is limited by the 
breadth of the actual consent itself.... 
Any police activity that transcends the ac-
tual scope of the consent given encroaches 
on the Fourth Amendment rights of the 
suspect." United States v. Gay, 774 F.2d 
368, 377 (10th Cir.1985); see, e.g., People v. 
Thiret, 685 P.2d 193, 201 (Colo.1984) (scope 
of consent exceeded when police asked to 
"look around" the house, then conducted a 
45-minute search of rooms, drawers, boxes 
and closed containers). 
The trial court made the following con-
elusory finding on the issue of Mr. Mar-
shall's consent: "The Defendant consented 
to the search. There was no evidence of 
duress or coercion." This conclusory find-
ing on consent is not particularly helpful in 
determining whether Mr. Marshall's con-
sent was "unequivocal and specific" as it 
does not detail what Mr. Marshall agreed 
could be searched—the interior of the pas-
senger compartment, the trunk, or the 
locked suitcases.10 Furthermore, the rele-
vant portions from the transcript of Troop-
er Avery's testimony are troubling: 
Q. [Defense Counsel] What were the 
words he [sic] used when you asked 
him to search his vehicle? 
10. See supra note 1 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of the importance of detailed find-
A. [Trooper Avery] I asked Mr. Mar-
shall if—if there were any—if there 
was any—were there any drugs in the 
vehicle, and he took two or three sec-
onds—no, wait a minute, I guess—I 
first asked him if he was carrying any 
weapons and he told me no. I then 
asked him if he was carrying any—if 
there was any alcohol in the vehicle, he 
said that he did not drink. I recall 
both answers were quite quick. And 
then I asked him if there were any 
drugs in the vehicle, he paused for, 
you know, probably two or three sec-
onds, and then told me no. I then 
asked him if it would be okay if I 
looked in the vehicle, search the ve-
hicle, and he said go ahead. 
Q. Now, did you ask if you could look in 
the vehicle, or did you ask if you could 
search the vehicle? 
A. Well, according to this [his report], I 
said—I asked if I could look in the 
vehicle. 
Q. So, it was "look in the vehicle"? 
You didn't ask if you could open any-
thing inside the vehicle or anything 
else, did you? 
A. No. I just asked if I could look in 
the vehicle. 
Q. And what happened then? 
A. Mr. Marshall just told me, you know, 
he said go right ahead. He got out, 
gathered up his papers and we walked 
up to the front of the vehicle, and he 
had to open the passenger door, as I 
recall. 
Q. And how did you get in the trunk? 
A. I asked him, I said—asked him if he 
had the key to the trunk and he says 
yes, and I says—and I asked him if 
he'[d] open it, which he did, he tried. 
He was extremely nervous at the time. 
I— 
Q. So did you open the trunk? 
A. No, sir, I did not. He—he could 
not—there was a little latch over the 
key hole. He was shaking so hard, he 
ings on a motion to suppress. 
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couldn't even hold the latch open, so I that "a loss of standing 
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held the latch up for him so he could 
insert the key. 
Without the assistance of specific find-
ings of fact, we cannot resolve the difficult 
issue of whether Mr. Marshall's opening 
the trunk constituted implied consent to 
search the trunk under the totality of the 
circumstances presented. See United 
States v. Almand, 565 F.2d 927, 930 (5th 
Cir.), cert, denied, 439 U.S. 824, 99 S.Ct. 92, 
58 L.Ed.2d 116 (1978) (voluntary consent 
found where defendant silently reached 
into his pocket, removed key, then unlocked 
and opened camper door). 
Furthermore, the record creates a sub-
stantial question as to whether the court's 
general finding that there was "no evi-
dence of duress or coercion" was intended 
to apply to the search of the trunk or, even 
if it was, whether the finding is consistent 
with the standard required for a voluntary 
consent. See United States v. Abbott, 546 
F.2d 883, 885 (10th Cir.1977); State v. Sier-
ra, 754 P.2d 972, 980-81 (Utah Ct.App. 
1988). Likewise, the court in its findings 
fails to focus on the search of the locked 
suitcases and the issues of voluntary con-
sent or abandonment. 
[16] Even if we were to accept the 
state's argument that the undisputed facts 
support a finding that Mr. Marshall aban-
doned u any expectation of privacy in the 
suitcases by his ambiguous disclaimer of 
ownership and that the state should be 
allowed to raise this fourth amendment 
standing issue for the first time on appeal, 
we would be unable to dispose of this case 
on the record before us. The state, in its 
petition for rehearing, correctly points out 
II. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 707 F.2d 
1169, 1173 (10th Ctr.1983) (Court found aban-
donment when police initially saw defendant 
running with a brown satchel, however, when 
they captured defendant, he did not have the 
satchel and disavowed knowledge of it. Police 
later found the satchel outside the building and 
searched it.); United States v. Kendall, 655 F.2d 
199, 202 (9th Cir. 1981). cert, denied, 455 U.S. 
941, 102 S.Ct. 1434. 71 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982) (court 
found abandonment where the defendant, after 
picking up the luggage at the claim area, pro-
duced a mismatched baggage claim check, told 
agents that his name was not on the luggage 
to challenge a 
search cannot be brought about by illegal 
police conduct." United States v. Labat, 
696 F.Supp. 1419, 1425 (D.Kan.1988). 
Thus, we would have to determine if the 
search of the trunk was illegal or was a 
result of a voluntary consent. This we 
cannot do on the record before us. 
Even if we determined the search of the 
trunk was unlawful, the "defendant must 
show a nexus between the allegedly unlaw-
ful police conduct and the abandonment of 
the property." Id. at 1426. See, e.g., Unit-
ed States v. Tolbert, 692 F.2d 1041 (6th 
Cir.1982), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 933, 104 
S.Ct. 337, 78 L.Ed.2d 306 (1983) (While "an 
unconstitutional seizure or arrest which 
prompts a disclaimer of property vitiates 
that act," id. at 1045, the court found the 
defendant's disclaimer was not precipitated 
by improper conduct. Id. at 1048.); United 
States v. Oilman, 684 F.2d 616, 620 (9th 
Cir.1982) ("There must be a nexus between 
the allegedly unlawful police conduct and 
abandonment of property if the challenged 
evidence is to be suppressed."); United 
States v. Beck, 602 F.2d 726, 730 (5th Cir. 
1979) (if there is a nexus between unlawful 
police conduct and the discovery of evi-
dence, the court should suppress the evi-
dence). See generally Search and Sei-
zure: What Constitutes Abandonment of 
Personal Property within Rule that 
Search and Seizure of Abandoned Prop-
erty Is Not Unreasonable—Modern Cases, 
40 A.L.R.4th 381 (1985). Again, there is no 
finding on this crucial issue. 
Therefore, we reverse and remand this 
interlocutory appeal for a rehearing on Mr. 
Marshall's motion to suppress on the limit-
ed issues of whether Mr. Marshall volun-
name tag, and allowed the agents to return the 
luggage to the claim area, thus giving the agents 
the impression that he had no interest in the 
luggage); United States v. Veatch, 674 F.2d 1217, 
1220-21 (9th Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 456 U.S. 
946, 102 S.Ct. 2013, 72 L.Ed.2d 469 (1982) (court 
found abandonment where the defendant dis-
claimed ownership of a wallet found on the seat 
of the vehicle); United States v. Colbert, 474 
F.2d 174, 177 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc) (court 
found abandonment when defendants dis-
claimed ownership of suitcases and began to 
walk away from them). 
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tanly consented to the search of the trunk 
or the suitcases, whether Mr Marshall 
abandoned any privacy interest in the suit 
cases and thus lacks standing to challenge 
their search, and finally, if the trial court 
finds there was an illegal search of the 
trunk or suitcases, whether there is a suffi 
cient nexus between that illegal search and 
Mr Marshall's abandonment, if any, of his 
expectation of privacy in the suitcases 
DAVIDSON and JACKSON, JJ, 
concur 
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Defendant was convicted in the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, David S 
Young, of aggravated robbery Defendant 
appealed The Court of Appeals, Davidson, 
J , held that (1) trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in admitting witness' in court 
identification testimony, (2) hearsay state 
ments were properly admitted under un 
available witness exception, and (3) defen 
dant's sentence was permissibly enhanced 
for use of firearm 
Affirmed 
1 Criminal Law «S=*339 9(3) 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in admitting salesperson's in court identifi 
cation of shoe store robbery defendant, 
even though witness had previously failed 
to identify defendant at line up, while de 
fendant's presence at counsel table may 
have been suggestive, there was adequate 
independent basis for identification 
2 Criminal Law 0=1169 5(2) 
Any error attributed to alleged mis 
identification of defendant by witness at 
trial was cured by detailed jury instruction 
which properly apprised jury of inherent 
limitations of eyewitness identification 
3 Criminal Law <S=*419(1, 5) 
Hearsay statements of witness are ad 
missible at trial provided that State can 
show witness' unavailability and prove that 
statement bears adequate indicia of rehabil 
ity U S C A Const Amend 6, Const Art 
1, § 12, Rules of Evid, Rule 804(a)(5) 
4 Criminal Law «S=»419(5) 
State showed unavailability of witness 
es, as required for witnesses' statements to 
be admissible under unavailable witness ex 
ception to hearsay rule, State subpoenaed 
each witness several times, attempted to 
make personal contact, and used mfor 
mants and other police resources to locate 
them, all of which proved unsuccessful 
U S C A Const Amend 6, Const Art 1, 
§ 12, Rules of Evid, Rule 804(a)(5) 
5 Criminal Law <s»419(5) 
Statements of unavailable witnesses 
had sufficient indicia of reliability to war 
rant admission under unavailable witness 
exception to hearsay rule, statements of 
witnesses were made against their penal 
interests, their statements were substan 
tially similar, and other evidence corrobo-
rated portions of statements U S C A 
Const Amend 6, Rules of Evid, Rules 
804(a)(5), 804(b)(3) 
6 Criminal Law «=>1208 6(4) 
Aggravated robbery defendant's sen 
tence was permissibly enhanced for use of 
firearm 
James A Valdez, Elizabeth Holbrook (ar 
gued), Salt Lake Legal Defender Asso, 
Salt Lake City for defendant and appei 
lant 
R Paul Van Dam, Atty Gen, Charlene 
Barlow (argued), Asst Atty Gen, for 
plaintiff and appellee 
STATE v. 
Cite aa 791 PJtd 890 
Before DAVIDSON, BILLINGS and 
0RME, JJ 
DAVIDSON, Judge 
Defendant appeals his conviction of ag 
gravated robbery He argues that the trial 
court erred by failing to suppress a wit 
ness's in court identification of defendant, 
by admitting hearsay statements of un 
available witnesses, and by enhancing his 
sentence for the use of a firearm We 
affirm 
On August 21, 1988, a man entered the 
Payless Shoe Store located in Magna, Utah, 
wearing pink and beige colored nylon 
stockings over his head and carrying a 
sawed off shotgun Two salespersons 
were working at the time The man or 
dered one salesperson to hand over all the 
money in the register and the other sales 
person to take all the money out of the safe 
and place it in a corduroy bag The sales 
person working at the register testified 
that she was looking at the man's face "the 
whole time " The second salesperson only 
viewed the man briefly 
After the robbery, a woman driving 
through the mall parking lot observed a 
man wearing something pink on his head, 
running alongside the Payless Shoe Store 
attempting to shove something into a bag 
The witness observed the man enter a 
small white station wagon driven by a 
black woman and watched the car exit the 
parking lot heading southbound on 5600 
West and later turning west on 3500 South 
She reported this information to the police 
after discovering that the shoe store had 
been robbed She later identified the car 
after the police had detained the car and its 
occupants 
Several blocks from the robbery, a 
fourth witness observed a light skinned 
black man exit a white compact station 
wagon Several minutes later, he observed 
a police officer pull the station wagon over 
and handcuff the vehicle's two remaining 
female occupants After observing this, he 
drove down the road where he observed the 
same black man The witness lost sight of 
the man for about fifteen or twenty mm 
utes, but later observed the same man 
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wearing different clothing The witness 
thereafter lost sight of the black man 
West Valley City Police Officer Kory 
Newbold responded to the Payless robbery 
While driving to Payless he observed a 
possible suspect vehicle travelling in the 
opposite direction The officer turned 
around, and pursued the vehicle He mo 
mentanly lost sight of the vehicle but later 
found it on a side street and pulled it over 
He questioned the two black female occu 
pants, but released them because they did 
not match the reported description Upon 
returning to the patrol car, the officer re 
ceived updated information on the suspects 
and getaway vehicle With this knowl 
edge, he again pulled the vehicle over and 
this time arrested the occupants 
At the arrest scene, one witness identi 
fied the car as the getaway vehicle, another 
recognized one of the women suspects as 
having been in the shoe store earlier in the 
day The bag of money and the shotgun 
used in the robbery were also found near 
the scene of arrest At the police station, 
the two suspects were interviewed by De 
tective Ron Edwards of the West Valley 
City Police Department Detective Ed 
wards later testified that both women ad 
mitted that they waited m the car while 
defendant robbed the shoe store Edwards 
also testified that both women told him 
that after the robbery they momentarily 
evaded police, let defendant out, and threw 
the money bag and gun out the window 
Neither woman testified at trial Instead, 
their testimony was admitted through De 
tective Edwards under the unavailability 
exception to the hearsay rule See Utah 
REvid 804 
Defendant was arrested the day after 
the robbery and was questioned by Detec 
tive Edwards Detective Edwards later 
testified that defendant confessed to the 
robbery after asking defendant's parole of 
ficer and another police officer to leave the 
interrogation room Neither the testimony 
of the two women nor defendant's testimo 
ny was recorded 
Two lineups were held several weeks af 
ter the robbery None of the witnesses 
brought to the lineup could identify defen 
